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THE CRIMINOGENIC EFFECTS OF
DAMAGING CRIMINAL LAW’S MORAL
CREDIBILITY
PAUL H. ROBINSON* & LINDSAY HOLCOMB**
ABSTRACT
The criminal justice system’s reputation in a community can significantly
affect the public’s willingness to comply with its demands and internalize its
norms. In the context of criminal law, empirical studies suggest that ordinary
people expect the criminal justice system to do justice and avoid injustice, as
they perceive it—a concept that has been called “empirical desert” to
distinguish it from the “deontological desert” of moral philosophers.
Empirical studies and many real-world natural experiments suggest that a
criminal justice system that regularly deviates from empirical desert loses
moral credibility and thereby loses crime-control effectiveness. These crimecontrol benefits, together with an analysis of the sometimes-disqualifying
weaknesses of alternative distributive principles, such as general deterrence
and incapacitation of the dangerous, suggest that maximizing criminal law’s
moral credibility is the best distributive principle available. Critics have
offered a range of objections to this proposal, which this Article considers
and answers.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the community observes the criminal law as regularly doing
injustice or failing to do justice, the law’s reputation as a reliable moral
authority suffers. This loss in moral credibility tends to reduce people’s
willingness to defer to the law’s demands and undermines criminal law’s
ability to make people internalize its norms. And where the disillusionment
arises from criminal law’s perceived failure to do justice, it can provoke
vigilantism. One of us has argued for several decades that these observations,
which are backed by common sense, repeated anecdotal evidence, and
empirical studies, suggest that criminal law’s distributive principle for
criminal liability and punishment ought to maximize the law’s moral
credibility with the community, which can generally be done most effectively
by having criminal law rely upon rules and policies that track the
community’s justice judgments, or so-called empirical desert.1
*
Colin S. Diver, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The authors wish to thank Sarah
Robinson for her generous research assistance. They also thank the critics who are cited here, for they
have inspired the authors to make their proposal and its implications clearer. © Paul H. Robinson
phr@law.upenn.edu.
**
Law Clerk to Judge John L. Badalamenti, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
1
See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT (Oxford
2013) [hereinafter INTUITIONS]; PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (Oxford 2008) [hereinafter DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES]; Paul H.
Robinson & Josh Bowers, Perceptions of Fairness & Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts
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Recent events have illustrated some of the effects of reduced moral
credibility. Those who believe that the police regularly engage in
wrongdoing without consequences have expressed their outrage in
sometimes violent protest, attacking officers and police stations. Those who
see these violent protestors as regularly escaping punishment, often with the
acquiescence of government officials, have confronted the protesters,
sometimes violently. This downward spiral of disillusionment and
vigilantism is just one of the mechanisms by which the system’s poor
reputation for doing justice reduces its crime-control effectiveness.
Some writers have criticized the proposal of a criminal law distributive
principle that maximizes moral credibility.2 This Article organizes and
responds to those criticisms. First, some criticisms challenge the claimed
causal connection between a system’s reduced moral credibility and people’s
inclination to comply with and defer to it. These issues are taken up in Part
II. Another kind of criticism, examined in Part III, challenges the claim that
criminal laws that conflict with community views undermine the criminal
law system’s moral credibility. A third kind of criticism suggests that it is
simply impossible to construct a distributive principle that will minimize
conflicts with community views, as discussed in Part IV. Part V examines
other philosophical, political, and ideological objections to the proposal
moral credibility as a distributive principle. Part VI raises what may be the
most important point in the debate: even if one could find flaws in the
proposed distributive principle of maximizing moral credibility by
minimizing conflicts between criminal law and community views—we agree
that it has weaknesses, although not those claimed by its critics—it is still
the best distibutive principle available because all alternatives have greater,
sometimes disqualifying, flaws. In other words, the greatest strength of
moral credibility as a distributive principle may be the weaknesses of all of
the proposed alternatives. Some potential weaknesses of the proposed
distributive principle that critics have not raised are offered in Part VII.
of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 (2012); Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey
P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1940 (2010); Paul H.
Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 29–39, 61–66 (Paul H. Robinson,
Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions
of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145–75 (2008)
[hereinafter Competing Conceptions]; Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, Intuitions of Justice:
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1–67 (2007) [hereinafter
Intuitions of Justice]; Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW U. L. REV. 453
(1997) [hereinafter Utility of Desert]; Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the
Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive vs. Normative Crime Control, 86 U. VA. L. REV. 1839, 1839–1869
(2000).
2
John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711
(2020); Christopher Slobogin, Empirical Desert and Preventive Justice: A Comment, 17 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 376 (2014); Julian V. Roberts & Jan W. de Keijser, Democratizing Punishment: Sentencing,
Community Views, and Values, 16 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 474, 486–93 (2014); Alice Ristroph, Third Wave
Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151 (2010); Mary Sigler, The Methodology of Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1173, 1185–87 (2010) [hereinafter Methodology of Desert]; Mary Sigler, The False Promise of
Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 39–41 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey &
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) [hereinafter False Promise]; Adam Kolber, Compliance-Promoting
Intuitions, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 41–43 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009); Alice Ristroph, The New Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 45–49
(Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) [hereinafter New Desert];
Adam Kolber, How to Improve Empirical Desert, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 433 (2009) [hereinafter Improve
Empirical Desert]; Deborah Denno, The Perils of Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741 (2000);
Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Desert: Criminal Law, Punishment
Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2000).

Robinson Book Proof (Do Not Delete)

2022]

3/25/2022 3:58 PM

The Criminogenic Effects

279

II. MORAL CREDIBILITY AND CRIME
The first of our claims is that the criminal law’s loss of moral credibility
with the community that it governs undermines its ability to gain that
community’s deference to, and internalization of, the criminal law’s norms.
Instead, this loss of moral credibility is likely to provoke resistance,
subversion, and vigilantism.
A. THE CRIMINOGENIC EFFECTS OF REDUCED CREDIBILITY
In many ways, the suggestion that criminal law’s reduced moral
credibility decreases compliance is just common sense. If a criminal law is
widely viewed as unjust or unwilling to do justice, would we assume that
this perception has no effect on the community’s deference to that law? In
what world would such a poor performance in achieving justice—the
criminal justice system’s ostensible purpose—be a matter of complete
indifference to citizens? And when such disillusionment does set in, do we
think that people would simply remain compliant?
1. The Disillusionment-Noncompliance Dynamic
in Natural Experiments
But is this commonsense view confirmed by experimental analysis? Not
many governments in the world would be likely to give the social
psychologist experimenter permission to degrade the justness of their
criminal justice systems in order to produce a resulting rise in crime.
However, there have been a variety of natural experiments in which a
criminal justice system’s moral credibility has been noticeably degraded, and
a corresponding reduction in compliance ensued. Consider a few examples
of these natural experiments.
In 1920, Congress prohibited the sale, manufacture, and transportation
of alcohol within the United States with the passage of the Eighteenth
Amendment. Demand for alcohol remained high, however, and illegal stills,
bootlegging operations, and speakeasies flourished. When even government
officials openly ignored the rules of Prohibition, this overt disrespect of
criminal law reinforced public disillusionment with the Prohibition
movement. As trust in the law waned, Americans violated the law to an even
greater extent. The disillusionment tainted not only the alcohol prohibition
rules but also reduced compliance with criminal laws unrelated to alcohol.3
An analogous dynamic is seen in widespread resistance to the draft
during the Vietnam War, which was enforced by criminal statutes requiring
service. Starting in 1964, many young men fled the country or feigned
injuries or illnesses in order to avoid service.4 Many who did not resist were
nonetheless highly critical in their view of not only this particular crime—
failure to report—but the criminal justice system and the government
3
PAUL ROBINSON & SARAH ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS, AND LEPERS: LESSONS FROM LIFE
OUTSIDE THE LAW 139–63 (2015).
4
DAVID CORTRIGHT, PEACE: A HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS 164–165 (2008); Blake
Stillwell, 11 Ways People Dodged the Draft During the Vietnam War, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 5, 2020)
https://www.businessinsider.com/11-ways-people-dodge-the-draft-during-the-vietnam-war-2020-1.
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generally.5 A significant portion of the public supported this view; polls
showed a society-wide dramatic drop in trust in government.6 With this
widespread disillusionment, crime rose significantly; crime statistics showed
an enormous spike in both violent crimes and property crimes.7 Many saw
the Vietnam War as exposing a moral stain on American institutions that had
long been widely trusted and revered. In response to this disillusionment,
many people felt free to abandon self-regulating behaviors and commit
crimes.8
This same dynamic between criminal law’s credibility and public
compliance with it is apparent in a variety of situations across many different
eras and cultures. To give an example with present-day relevance, in 1918,
as the Spanish Flu swept through the United States, communities across the
country instituted public health measures to slow the spread. Foremost
among these was mask-wearing.9 However, many people were unpersuaded
that the inconvenience and the intrusiveness of the government action were
justified by its supposed health benefits. When some local governments
imposed mandatory mask ordinances and punished those who flouted the
law with jail terms and fines,10 many in the community resisted. The sense
that the mask mandates were excessive and the punishments, unfair sparked
protests en masse. In Denver, one local newspaper reported that the order to
wear a mask was “almost totally ignored by the people; in fact, the order was
a cause of mirth.”11 In San Francisco, 2,000 members of the Anti-Mask
League held a rally to denounce the mask ordinance,12 and in Tucson, despite
5
Ilyana Kuziemko, Did the Vietnam Draft Increase Human Capital Dispersion? Draft-Avoidance
Behavior By Race and Class, (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/
mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/5798/vietnam.pdf.
6
Writing in the New York Review of Books at the time, Hannah Arendt explained, “Truth or
falsehood—it does not matter which any more, if your life depends on your acting as though you trusted;
truth that can be relied on disappears from public life and with it the chief stabilizing factor in the everchanging affairs of men.” Hannah Arendt, Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 18, 1971), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/11/18/lying-in-politics-reflect
ions-on-the-pentagon-pape; see also Josh Zeitz, How Americans Lost Faith in Government, WASH. POST.
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/01/30/how-americans
-lost-faith-in-government.
7
See Crime Rate Up 11% for Nation in 1970, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 10, 1971), https://
www.nytimes.com/1971/09/10/archives/crime-rate-up-11-for-nation-in-1970-crime-in-nation-up-11-in1970.html.
8
Steven Pinker, Decivilization in the 1960s, HUM. FIGURATIONS (July 2013), https://quod.lib.
umich.edu/h/humfig/11217607.0002.206/--decivilization-in-the-1960s?rgn=main;view=fulltext.
9
James Rolph, Proclamation of Mayor Asks Masks For All, S.F. CHRON. Oct. 22, 1918, at 8,
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/1620flu.0009.261/1/--proclamation-of-mayor-asks-masks-for-all?rgn=
full+text;view=image;q1=conscience%2C+patriotism+and+self-protection+demand+immediate+and+ri
gid+compliance (“Conscience, patriotism and self-protection demand immediate and rigid compliance.”);
John Davie, Wear Mask, Says Law, Or Face Arrest, OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 25, 1918, at 9, https://
quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/8540flu.0007.458/1/--wear-mask-says-law-or-face-arrest?rgn=full+text;view=
image;q1=Face+Arrest (Oakland Mayor John Davie explained to his constituents: “[i]t is sensible and
patriotic, no matter what our personal beliefs may be, to safeguard our fellow citizens by joining in this
practice . . . .”).
10
J. Alexander Navarro, Mask Resistance During a Pandemic Isn’t New—In 1918 Many Americans
Were ‘Slackers,’ MICH. HEALTH (Oct. 29, 2020, 8:43 PM), https://healthblog.uofmhealth.org/wellnessprevention/mask-resistance-during-a-pandemic-isnt-new-1918-many-americans-were-slackers.
11
New Orders Are Issued By Officials in Flu Fight, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 26, 1918,
at 1, 5, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/2290flu.0003.922/3/--new-orders-are-issued?page=root;rgn=full
+text;size=200;view=image;q1=New+Orders+are+issued.
12
New Cases of Influenza at Low Record, S.F. EXAM’R, Jan. 26, 1919, at 12, https://quod.lib.umi
ch.edu/f/flu/1320flu.0009.231/1/--new-cases-of-influenza-at-low-record?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=
150;view=image;q1=New+Cases+of+Influenza+at+Low+Record [http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.1320
flu.0009.231].
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widespread arrests and incarceration, people intentionally disregarded the
mask ordinance.13 The local paper in Tuscon declared that the mask
ordinance “was incapable of enforcement. No matter how many citizens the
city authorities might have taken to the lock-up nor how many fines they
imposed, they never could have brought about the general observance of
masking.”14 In fact, irritated as they were by the mask ordinances and their
associated criminal penalties, people took more and more liberties, hosting
large gatherings and refusing to wear masks properly (or at all) even when
under the scrutiny of officers.15 Crimes in other areas of life rose as well—
prostitution expanded, as did drug consumption and attacks on immigrants.16
Without buy-in from the community generally, greater enforcement served
only to provoke greater resistance and reduced compliance.
In the 1960s Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, where criminal law
violations were increasingly met with charges and sentences that seemed
grossly disproportionate, aggressive policing and punishment did not reduce
crime as intended but, rather, increased it17 as the criminal justice system’s
credibility within the neighborhood weakened. In August 1965, this tension
came to a boiling point after a Watts resident’s violent encounter with the
police inspired the community to take to the streets.18 Media coverage of the
riot from the period reported that “the outburst was in large measure a protest
against Police Chief William Parker’s cops.”19 Another report found that “the
incident that ignite[d] disorder ar[ose] from police action.”20 The report
described an “atmosphere of hostility and cynicism” as well as “a widespread
perception among Negroes of the existence of police brutality and corruption
and of a ‘double standard’ of justice and protection – one for Negroes and
one for whites.”21
At the end of the nineteenth century during the Gilded Age in New York
City, the legislative process in New York City was notoriously corrupt—even
valuable and legitimate legislation could not be passed unless the right
political players were paid off.22 The result was a body of criminal law that
13
Bradford Luckingham, To Mask or Not to Mask: A Note on the 1918 Spanish Influenza Epidemic
in Tucson, 25 J. OF ARIZ. HIST. 191, 199 (1984).
14
Id. at 201–02.
15
Id. at 202.
16
DAVID BLANKE, THE 1910S 11–14 (Greenwood Press 2002).
17
See James Queally, Watts Riots: Traffic Stop Was the Spark that Ignited Days of Destruction in
L.A., L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2015, 9:20 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riotsexplainer-20150715-htmlstory.html (explaining that “Anger and distrust between Watts’ residents, the
police and city officials had been simmering for years” and that many Watts residents suggested that the
“riot had been triggered by long-smoldering resentment against alleged police brutality”); see also
ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME 108 (Harvard Uni. Press 2016)
(arguing that “haphazard, undisciplined, and aggressive police response only spawned an ever-moreviolent reaction” and then Cabinet member Ramsey Clark warned that aggressive policing had backfired
by “starting guerilla war in the streets”).
18
GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S 53–60 (1995).
19
Who’s to Blame?, TIME (Aug. 27, 1965), https://time.com/vault/issue/1965-08-27/page/18/.
20
OTTO KERNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION OF CIVIL DISORDERS 93
(1968).
21
Id.
22
Lincoln Steffens, TWEED DAYS IN ST. LOUIS (1902), reprinted in The Shame of the Cities 34
(McClure, Phillips & Co.1904). Lincoln Steffens’ essays on corruption in McClure’s Magazine painted a
dismal picture of a political system hanging to credibility by a thread. See generally id. Discussing the
rampant rent-seeking practices to get legislation passed, Steffens wrote, “As there was a scale for
favorable legislation, so there was one for defeating bills . . . . [I]t made a difference in the price if there

Robinson Book Proof (Do Not Delete)

282

Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal

3/25/2022 3:58 PM

[Vol. 31:277

simply failed to address the full range of conduct that social mores at the
time condemned, such as abortion, gambling, and pornography.23 As the
criminal law came to be seen as increasingly out of touch with community
norms, crime increased.24 Street gangs proliferated, and even shoplifting
among middle-class women rose.25
At the beginning of the Cold War, Berlin was divided into occupation
zones controlled by the United States, Great Britain, and France—the Allied
Sectors—and the Soviet Union—East Berlin. In 1948, after negotiations
between the Allies and the Soviets broke down, the Soviets restricted the
delivery of food, coal, and other crucial supplies into the Allied Sectors and
controlled distribution within East Berlin according to political ideology.26
Only those who professed allegiance to the Kremlin received provisions.27
The restrictions created a thriving black market, which the Soviets worked
to prevent with increasingly harsh penalties for unauthorized dealings.28
These penalties were enforced by police officers who were chosen because
of their “political reliability”—their commitment to the Kremlin—rather
than professional competence.29 In that sense, the laws could never be seen
as fair, neutral, or unpolitical.30 But as the penalties for such offenses became
more severe, the stigma surrounding such lawbreaking decreased and
lawbreaking actually increased.31 These small acts of resistance aimed not
only to secure sustenance for Berliners but also to signal that the Soviet

was opposition, and it made a difference whether the privilege asked was a legitimate one or not. But
nothing was passed free of charge.” Id.
23
Charles A. Ellwood, Has Crime Increased in the United States Since 1880?, 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 385 (1910); Elizabeth Garner Mazarik, Selling Sex: 19th Century New York
City Prostitution and Brothels, THE DIG: A HISTORY PODCAST (Sept. 3, 2017), https://digpodcast.
org/2017/09/03/19th-century-new-york-city-brothels.
24
DANIEL CZITROM, NEW YORK EXPOSED: THE GILDED AGE POLICE SCANDAL THAT LAUNCHED
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 88, 246–47 (2016); NEW YORK: ART AND CULTURAL CAPITAL OF THE GILDED
AGE 210 (Margaret R. Laster & Chelsea Bruner eds., 2019) (explaining that despite the strenuous efforts
of social reformers, “pornography constituted an insistent part of Gilded Age visual culture.”).
25
See generally Dan Herbeck, Crime Was Rampant and Routine in 19th Century New York City, THE
BUFFALO NEWS (Feb. 10, 1991), https://buffalonews.com/news/crime-was-rampant-and-routine-in-19thcentury-new-york-city/article_bee1c130-9005-5c8e-9443-a3188c1bb889.html; HERBERT ASBURY, THE
GANGS OF NEW YORK 64s (Vintage Books 2008); ELAINE S. ABELSON, WHEN LADIES GO A-THIEVING:
MIDDLE-CLASS SHOPLIFTERS IN THE VICTORIAN DEPARTMENT STORE 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
26
PAUL STEEGE, BLACK MARKET, COLD WAR: EVERYDAY LIFE IN BERLIN, 1946–1949 36
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); Katie Lange, The Berlin Airlift: What it Was, Its Importance in the Cold
War, U.S. DEP’T. of DEF. (June 25, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Inside-DOD/Blog/
Article/2062719/the-berlin-airlift-what-it-was-its-importance-in-the-cold-war.
27
MALTE ZIERENBERG, BERLIN’S BLACK MARKET, 127–86 (2015); MARK FENEMORE, FIGHTING
THE COLD WAR IN POST-BLOCKADE, PRE-WALL BERLIN ch. 6–7 (Routledge 2019).
28
Alice Autumn Weinreb, Matters of Taste: The Politics of Food and Hunger in Divided Germany
1945–1971, at 100–01 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the University of
Michigan Library system) (“The remarkable scale of bartering, stealing, and gathering food stuffs
throughout all four zones, and especially the almost universal participation in the black market, make
clear that the rationing calories allotted German civilians were not the population’s only source of
sustenance.”)
29
Richard Bessel, Policing in East Germany in the Wake of the Second World War, CRIME, HIST. &
SOC’YS, Dec. 2003, at 11, 14 (“The unpopularity of the police is not accounted for only by unsatisfactory
personnel policies, social difficulties and shortcomings . . . but also has its causes in the present-day
economic situation of the population. The police very frequently are compelled to intervene against smallscale hoarders . . . who are trying to improve their diet by buying additional food . . . . [T]hese measures
by the police are regarded as unjust.”).
30
Id. at 19.
31
ANDREI CHERNY, THE CANDY BOMBERS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE BERLIN AIRLIFT AND
AMERICA’S FINEST HOUR 433–34 (2008); Steege, supra note 26, at 185.
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justice system was no longer seen as morally credible.32 After all, black
market dealing was, to some extent, an ideological threat to the Soviet
political project, exemplifying free-market enterprise in no uncertain terms.33
Despite the greater scarcity in the Allied Sectors, East Berliners increasingly
escaped to West Berlin, in part because they felt they could better trust the
government and police.34 Under a justice system they perceived as more
trustworthy, escaped East Berliners committed less crime.35
2. Disillusionment Expressed as Vigilantism
Disillusionment-induced lawlessness frequently takes the form of
vigilantism. As noted previously, current events illustrate this point. For
example, many people saw the death of George Floyd, who was suffocated
when an officer placed his knee on Floyd’s neck during his arrest, as
symptomatic of the criminal justice system’s indifference to police
wrongdoing against Black people. Two activists summarized this view in a
New York Times op-ed after Floyd’s death, writing, “The problem is that the
entire criminal justice system gives police officers the power and opportunity
to systematically harass and kill with impunity.”36 In the weeks that followed,
police in many cities were targeted, including in St. Louis, where eleven
police officers were shot at in five separate attacks.37 In Seattle, protesters
attacked and firebombed a police station.38 In Compton, a man ambushed
two officers who were sitting in their patrol car, shooting them both and
injuring them severely.39 And in Los Angeles, a man walked into a police
station and began firing wantonly at officers after pretending to seek
assistance.40
But this vigilante impulse is not limited to those who distrust the justice
system for its perceived lawlessness; those who believe that the system too
often tolerates lawlessness among the public also have resorted to vigilante
violence. For example, in the aftermath of Floyd’s death, several hundred
protesters marching to the mayor’s house in St. Louis broke down a gate and
32
CHERNY, supra note 31; see also Steege, supra note 26, at 14 (explaining that economic crimes
were situated at “the intersection of competing senses of entitlement, justice, legitimacy, and power that
were all bound up with the daily struggle to meet individual supply needs.”).
33
Bessel, supra note 29, at 14.
34
Leslie Colitt, Escape From East Berlin, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2011, 4:01 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/16/escape-from-east-berlin.
35
CHERNY, supra note 31, at 475; Steege, supra note 26, at 233; Mary Fulbrook, The State and the
Transformation of Political Legitimacy in East and West Germany Since 1945, 29 COMPAR. STUD. SOC’Y
& HIST. 211, 214–230 (1987).
36
Philip V. McHarris & Thenjiwe McHarris, No More Money for the Police, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/opinion/george-floyd-police-funding.html.
37
Christine Byers, ‘Nobody’s Safe in This City Right Now’: Police Officers Shot in St. Louis This
Summer, KSDK (Aug. 3, 2020, 1:46 PM), https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/crime/st-louis-policeofficers-shot-summer-2020/63-d01a9932-4769-47dc-9fa5-55283c1dd97c; Jim Salter, Police: 4 St. Louis
Officers Hit by Gunfire During Protests, FULTON SUN (June 2, 2020, 9:28 AM), https://www.fultonsun.
com/news/local/story/2020/jun/02/missouri-protests-remain-tense-in-kansas-city-st-louis/829410.
38
Tammy Mutasa, Seattle Rioters Caught on Camera Trying to Trap Police in East Precinct, Set it
on Fire, KOMO NEWS REPORTER (Aug. 25, 2020), https://komonews.com/news/local/police-spokes
person-accuses-rioters-of-attempted-murder-for-trying-to-barricade-officers.
39
Elliott C. McLaughlin & Cheri Mossburg, Police Identify and Charge Man With Shooting Two
Deputies, and He Was Already in Custody, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/us/deonte-murraycompton-deputies-shooting-suspect-arrest/index.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2020 10:54 PM).
40
Madeline Holcombe, LAPD Officer Injured After Shooting at Harbor Station, CNN, https://
www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/us/lapd-harbor-shooting-officer-injured/index.html (last updated Sept. 27,
2020 5:12 AM).
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trespassed on the property of private citizens Mark and Patricia McCloskey.41
Police and prosecutors had ignored many previous violent protests and did
nothing to intervene on this occasion, causing the McCloskeys to believe that
they had to rely on themselves.42 The McCloskeys took it upon themselves
to confront the group, he, with an assault rifle and she, with a semiautomatic
handgun, and they were charged with unlawful use of a weapon.43 Similarly,
seventeen-year-old Kyle Rittenhouse traveled to Kenosha, Wisconsin to help
protect businesses that had been previously damaged in a violent protest,
which local police and prosecutors had failed to prevent.44 He took with him
his an assault rifle, and shot and killed two people after they tried to wrestle
the rifle out of his hands.45 Rittenhouse was charged with, among other
things, first-degree intentional homicide.46
3. Empirical Studies Showing the DisillusionmentNoncompliance Dynamic
But one need not simply rely on common sense and anecdotal evidence
to see the disillusionment-lawlessness connection, as the dynamic is
confirmed by controlled social psychology studies. The research suggests
that the relationship between the criminal law’s moral credibility and the
community’s deference to it is widespread and nuanced. Even minor
diminutions in moral credibility that occur over time can produce
corresponding losses in compliance.47
Consider, for example, a study using a within-subjects design in which
subjects were asked a number of questions relating to various ways in which
the criminal law’s moral credibility is thought to affect deference,
compliance, and the internalization of its norms.48 The study presented
subjects with a number of scenarios to assess subjects’ general attitudes
towards the criminal justice system, namely: Will a citizen assist police by
reporting a crime? Will they assist in the investigation and prosecution of a
41
Central West End Couple Explains Why They Pointed Guns at Protesters Who Demanded
Krewson’s Resignation CBS KMOV4 (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.kmov.com/2022/02/04/central-westend-couple-explains-why-they-pointed-guns-protesters-who-demanded-krewsons-resignation/.
42
Id.; Christine Byers, Charges Filed Against McCloskeys, St. Louis Couple Who Pointed Guns
Toward Protesters, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (July 20, 2020, 6:55 PM), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/
politics-issues/2020-07-20/charges-filed-against-mccloskeys-st-louis-couple-who-pointed-guns-towardprotesters (on the decision to charge the McCloskeys, St. Louis Circuit Attorney said, “We must protect
the right to peacefully protest, and any attempt to chill it through intimidation will not be tolerated.”).
43
Jessica Lussenhop, Mark and Patricia McCloskey: What Really Went On in St Louis that Day?,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2020,) https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-53891184.
44
Pauleen Le, Fires, Chaos Erupts in Kenosha for a 2nd Night Following Jacob Blake Shooting,
CBS58 (Aug. 25, 2020, 5:23 AM), https://www.cbs58.com/news/fires-chaos-erupts-in-kenosha-insecond-night-following-jacob-blake-shooting; see also Eric Levenson & Omar Jimenez, Things We
Learned From Kyle Rittenhouse’s Trial That Challenge Assumptions About the Case, CNN
(Nov. 19, 2021) https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/18/us/kyle-rittenhouse-what-we-learned-from-trial/index.
html (summarizing Kyle Rittenhouse’s testimony).
45
Minyvonne Burke, Kyle Rittenhouse, Charged with Killing Two Kenosha Protesters, Has Bond Set
at $2M, NBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2020, 7:31 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kyle-ritten
house-charged-killing-2-kenosha-protesters-has-bond-set-n1245953.
46
Akane Otani, Who Is Kyle Rittenhouse and What Happened in the Kenosha Shootings?, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 29, 2020, 3:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-is-kyle-rittenhouse-and-what-happenedin-the-kenosha-shootings-11598653456; Yael Halon, ‘Tucker Carlson Tonight’ Airs Never-Before-Seen
Footage From Deadly Kenosha Shooting, FOX NEWS (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/media/
kenosha-shooting-new-footage-kyle-rittenhouse-tucker.
47
See generally INTUITIONS supra note 1; see generally Robinson et al., supra note 1.
48
See generally Robinson et al., supra note 1, at 1997–2004.
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crime? Do people take the imposition of criminal liability and punishment as
a reliable sign that the defendant has done something truly condemnable? Do
people take the extent of the liability imposed as a reliable indication of the
seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of the offender?49 With a
baseline established on these issues, subjects were then disillusioned by
being exposed to accounts of the system’s failures of justice and
perpetrations of injustice. Later retesting showed that the measures of
deference, compliance, and internalization of norms had all decreased among
the disillusioned subjects.50
A follow-up study used a between-subjects design, giving different
levels of disillusionment to three different groups and then testing their levels
of deference, compliance, and internalization.51 The results confirm the
conclusions of the earlier within-subjects study: the greater the
disillusionment, the greater the loss in deference, compliance, and
internalization. A third study analyzing responses in large preexisting
datasets came to a similar conclusion using regression analysis.52
The results in the studies are particularly striking because, in each case,
subjects came to the study with preexisting views on the criminal justice
system’s reputation for being just. The experimenters, within the context of
the study, could only nudge those preexisting views. Yet even that
incremental disillusionment produced corresponding incremental reductions
in deference and compliance. This is a particularly important finding because
it means that, no matter the current state of a criminal justice system’s moral
credibility with the community, any incremental reduction in credibility can
incrementally reduce deference—and any increase can likewise increase
deference. Many other studies document the same point.
A 2002 study on the “flouting thesis”—the idea that the perceived justice
of one law can influence compliance with unrelated laws—found that rules
regarded as unjust have “subtle but pervasive influences on people’s
deference to and respect for the law in their everyday lives.”53 The
experiment consisted of two parts. First, participants were exposed to a set
of laws which were chosen because of their apparent justness or unjustness.54
Participants read about the laws in newspaper stories, which varied in their
discussions of civil forfeiture, income tax, and landlord-tenant laws so as to
emphasize the fairness or unfairness of the laws.55 Next, participants were
told that they would be participating in a separate study in which they were
asked to indicate their willingness to engage in particular types of future lawbreaking.56 These items included drunk driving, parking in a no-parking
zone, failing to pay taxes, and drinking alcohol under age twenty-one.57 Noncompliance in the second study served as an indication of so-called
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 1998–99.
Id. at 1999–2000.
See id. at 2004–05.
Id. at 2017–18, 2021–23.
Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law: Does Perceived Injustice Provoke General Non-Compliance?,
(NW. UNIV. SCH. OF L. & ECON. RSCH. PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 02–09, 3 2002), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=353745.
54
Id. at 9.
55
Id. at 10–11.
56
Id. at 9.
57
Id. at 12.
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“flouting” behavior.58 The study found that there was an overall trend for
participants primed with unjust laws to demonstrate a higher probability of
engaging in criminal behavior.59 That is, perceptions of an unjust law
activated a more general attitude about the unjustness of the legal system,
even if that attitude was subconscious.60
A 2007 study using data from the European Union found that social
willingness to comply with the law has significant positive effects on
controlling traffic fatalities, outweighing even the influence of traffic
exposure, speed, and alcohol consumption.61 The authors examined road
safety data from fifteen European countries and modeled the number of
fatalities in terms of social willingness to comply, controlling for factors such
as traffic exposure, vehicle fleet characteristics, road infrastructure and
economic conditions, population characteristics, and road user behavior.62
The authors found that social legitimacy is “a sine qua non for effective (road
safety) policy because lack of public support will lead to insufficient
willingness to comply and, in turn, to more traffic fatalities.”63 Regardless of
the specific content of the respective countries’ traffic laws, the law-abiding
behavior of drivers was found to have a measured positive effect on traffic
fatalities.64 “The core idea of our paper is that social norms prevail over
laws,” the authors explained.65 That is, the public’s allegiance to the law writ
large—evidenced by their willingness or unwillingness to comply with the
law—was simply more important than the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
specific traffic laws.66
A 2008 study of Swedes assessed whether there was a correlation
between low institutional trust and, among other things, illegal alcohol
consumption.67 Alcohol consumption is a hotly contested topic in Sweden,
and the Swedish national parliament has passed several laws intended to
limit alcohol consumption.68 Sweden also has a state monopoly over alcohol
sales.69 The authors of the study hypothesized that lower institutional trust
“may be associated with high alcohol consumption” because “public
institutions in Sweden are consistent and coherent in the way they view
aspects such as high alcohol consumption” as negative.70 The researchers
asked respondents about their drinking habits and probed their trust in
various societal institutions.71 The results showed that lack of trust was
58
59
60
61

Id. at 9.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 28.
Lode Vereeck & Klara Vrolix, The Social Willingness to Comply with the Law: The Effect of Social
Attitudes on Traffic Fatalities, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 385, 385 (2007).
62
Id. at 397–98.
63
Id. at 402.
64
Id. at 386.
65
Id. at 402.
66
Id.
67
Johanna Ahnquist, Martin Lindstrom & Sarah P. Wamala, Institutional Trust and Alcohol
Consumption in Sweden: The Swedish National Public Health Survey 2006, 8 BMC PUB. HEALTH 283,
284 (2008).
68
See generally Richard F. Tomasson, Alcohol and Alcohol Control in Sweden, 70 SCANDINAVIAN
STUDIES 477 (1998).
69
Tim Stockwell et al., Estimating the Public Health Impact of Disbanding a Government Alcohol
Monopoly: Application of New Methods to the Case of Sweden 18 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 1, 2 (2018)
(available at https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12889-018-6312-x.pdf).
70
Ahnquist et al., supra note 67, at 285.
71
Id. at 285–289.
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associated with increased likelihood of harmful alcohol consumption.72 High
trust in institutions, in contrast, was correlated with a greater inclination to
follow the advice of public officials, trust in experts, and take steps to limit
their own alcohol consumption.73 Ultimately, the study suggested that those
who do not doubt a particular institution’s legitimacy are more likely to heed
that institution’s rules and recommendations.
A 2003 study on the reasons why taxpayers obey rather than simply
evade taxes found that trust in the legal system had a strong effect on
compliance.74 Based on preexisting survey data from Europe, the study’s
authors asked respondents to rank whether they thought that cheating on
taxes was “always justified,” “never justified,” or one of several options in
the middle.75 Respondents were also asked to rank how much confidence
they had in the legal system on a scale of “none at all” to “a great deal of
confidence.”76 The study’s authors found that a perception of legitimacy in
the legal system had a highly significant effect on so-called “tax morale,”
namely “why people do not cheat on their taxes.”77 In fact, an increase in the
trust scale of just one unit, increased the subjects’ likelihood to find cheating
on taxes to be unjustified by 3.5 percentage points.78 “[T]rust in the legal
system leads to acceptance of governments’ decisions and produces the
incentive to obey the rules,” the authors concluded.79 Furthermore, where the
public believed that officials were honest and competent—measured by their
reported level of agreement with the statement “Public officials can usually
be trusted to do what’s right”—willingness to comply with tax payments
increased further.80 Ultimately, the results suggest that, rather than focusing
on enforcement, governments concerned with cultivating “tax morale”
should try to create confidence in the legal system and in the trustworthiness
and capability of tax officials.
A 2009 study used survey data from a number of African countries to
model the relationship between perceptions that a government is fair and
trustworthy and beliefs that it deserves deference to its rules.81 The authors
focused on factors that they believed would induce “voluntary deference to
the directives of authorities and rules precisely because they are believed
legitimate.”82 The data used in the study was collected through a survey of
more than twenty-three thousand respondents across eighteen countries and
modeled in an effort to capture citizens’ perceptions of institutional
72
73
74

Id. at 289.
Id. at 290.
Benno Torgler, Tax Morale, Rule Governed Behavior and Trust, 14 CONST. POL. ECON. 119, 134
(2003).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. (“To assess the level of tax morale we use the following question: Please tell me for each of the
following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in
between: (. . .) Cheating on tax if you have the chance. The question leads to a ten scale index of tax
morale with the two extreme points ‘never justified’ and ‘always justified’. The ten-point scale has been
recoded into a four-point scale (0, 1, 2, 3), with the value 3 standing for ‘never justifiable’. 4-10 has been
integrated in the value 0 due to a lack of variance.”). Id. at 134.
78
Id. at 137.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Margaret Levi, Audrey Sacks & Tom Tyler, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating
Beliefs, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 354, 361 (2009).
82
Id. at 355.
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legitimacy in relation to their willingness to obey the police, courts, and tax
department.83 The survey asked respondents the degrees to which they
believed that administrators were corrupt, authorities were capable of
detecting and punishing crime, and the government treated citizens fairly.84
Standard sociodemographic variables that can affect citizens’ acceptance of
government authority, including household income, were controlled for.85
The authors found considerable evidence of a link between the perceived
trustworthiness of government and criminal justice mechanisms and citizens’
willingness to defer to these institutions.86 The results indicated that “the
more trustworthy and fair the government, the more likely its population will
develop legitimating beliefs that lead them to accept the government’s right
to make people obey its laws and regulations.”87
Notice that these last several studies tested not only the effect of people’s
perceptions of the justness of the various criminal justice systems’ laws and
dispositions but also their fairness in adjudicating cases and the
trustworthiness and legitimacy of their respective governments generally.
Natural experiments and empirical studies on these issues are relevant to this
Article’s present purpose because they confirm that a criminal justice
system’s reputation can have significant real-world effects on compliance
with its laws and regulations.
4. Natural Experiments on Law Enforcement
Legitimacy and Compliance
There exist a host of natural experiments demonstrating the connection
between compliance and a criminal justice system’s reputation for law
enforcement legitimacy. Consider several examples.
The relationship between the police and the public in Nigeria presents
something of an extreme case of unprofessional policing leading to
diminished compliance. The police in Nigeria have been notoriously corrupt
since the turn of the twenty-first century.88 According to human rights
groups, the Nigerian police often extort money from the public at taxi stands,
marketplaces, and roadblocks.89 When citizens fail to pay the bribes, they are
sometimes beaten, sexually assaulted, or shot.90 Further, the police often
neglect to perform their basic duties unless they are bribed.91 Crimes are not
investigated unless the victim is able to persuade the police to act, and
officers at the upper echelons of the police force are widely known to siphon
off significant portions of public funds for their personal uses.92 A survey
gauging Nigerian public opinion on police legitimacy found that a majority
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 361.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 367.
Id.
“Everyone’s In on the Game”: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Aug. 17, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/17/everyones-game/corruption-andhuman-rights-abuses-nigeria-police-force#.
89
Id. at 26.
90
Id. at 40–50.
91
In Nigeria, Majority of Police Encounters Marked by Bribery, Difficulty Getting Assistance,
Survey Shows, AFRO BAROMETER (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.afrobarometer.org/press/nigeriamajority-police-encounters-marked-bribery-difficulty-getting-assistance-survey-shows.
92
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 88.
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of those surveyed expressed having “no confidence” in the police.93 As one
woman reported, “Any witness or crime victim who approaches the police
without bearing in mind their lack of integrity and possible complicity in
crime may end up becoming the criminal. The police doubt everything about
you.”94 Another study found that Nigeria is plagued by “low levels of citizen
cooperation with the police”95 and “a loss of confidence of the common man
in the criminal justice system,”96 and still another found that “less than a
tenth (7.7%) of [surveyed Nigerians] trust the police.”97 As a result of this
distrust, crime throughout Nigeria has increased.98 Analyses of crime data
between 1999 and 2013 show that armed robberies have increased
dramatically even as the Nigerian police received more and more resources
from the state.99 Mistrust of the state is among the causes of heightened
violence in recent years.100 As one commentator has noted, “The situation is
getting worse. The government has completely failed to provide even basic
security.” In fact, some members of the Nigerian public have taken the law
into their own hands by lynching suspects of crimes or flouting the law
altogether by shoplifting and committing car thefts, fraud schemes, and
computer crimes.101 Ultimately, crime has only become more widespread and
diverse in Nigeria as the police have become more corrupt, unprofessional,
and ineffective.
After the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the
Department of Justice conducted an investigation finding that Ferguson’s
policing practices led to distrust and resentment among many in the Ferguson
community, which is 67% Black.102 The report explained, “African
Americans’ views of FPD [Ferguson Police Department] are shaped not just
by what FPD officers do, but how they do it.”103 Dozens of Ferguson
residents told of officers cursing at them, verbally harassing them, and
randomly brandishing their weapons in threatening ways.104 The crime rate,
and especially the homicide rate, in Ferguson rose precipitously after the
93
Johnson Oluwole Ayodele & Adeyinka Abideen Aderinto, Public Confidence in the Police and
Crime Reporting Practices of Victims in Lagos, Nigeria: A Mixed Methods Study, 9 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST.
SCI. 46, 54 (2014).
94
Id. at 56.
95
Olufunmilayo Oloruntimehin, Crime and Control in Nigeria, in CRIME AND CONTROL IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 165 (Hans-Gunther Heiland et al. eds., 1991).
96
Id. at 182.
97
Etannibi E.O. Alemika, Crime and Public Safety in Nigeria, CLEEN FOUND. 21 (2014),
http://new.cleen.org/Crime%20and%20Public%20Safety%20in%20Nigeria.pdf; CHARLES OMOLE, THE
NIGERIAN POLICE-PUBLIC RELATIONSHIP 73–91 (2017).
98
Etannibi E.O. Alemika & Innocent C. Chukwuma, Police-Community Violence in Nigeria,
CTR. FOR L. ENFORCEMENT EDU. & NAT’L HUM. RTS. COMM. 63(1999) https://nairametrics.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/police-community-violence.pdf.
99
Pelumi E. Oguntunde, Oluwadare O. Ojo, Hilary I. Okagbue & Omoleye A. Oguntunde, Analysis
of Selected Crime Data in Nigeria, 19 DATA IN BRIEF 1242, 1245 (2018).
100
Alonso Soto, Once Africa’s Promise, Nigeria is Heaving Under Cirme, Few Jobs, ALJAZEERA
(June 15, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/6/15/once-africas-promise-nigeria-is-heavin
g-under-crime-scare-jobs.
101
Oloruntimehin, supra note 95, at 183.
102
German Lopez, What Did the Justice Departmnet’s Investigation Into the Ferguson Police
Department Find?, VOX (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2015/5/31/17937860/justice-departmentferguson-police-michael-brown-shooting.
103
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., THE FERGUSON REPORT: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON 123 (2015).
104
Id. at 123–24.
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shooting.105 While some of this increase in crime may have been due to
reduced police intervention—the phenomenon known as the “Ferguson
effect”—one study suggests that a major contributor was the dramatic loss
in police legitimacy crystallized by the Michael Brown killing and the
protests that followed it.106 That is, instances of police use of lethal force
against unarmed civilians diminish the public’s trust in the police, causing
“(1) Higher crime rates as a direct reaction to diminished police legitimacy;
(2) Reduced cooperation with police; (3) Reduced police budgets.”107
Damage to the reputation of the criminal justice system can undermine
compliance, even when the damage stems from a perception of governmental
illegitimacy apart from unfair criminal justice adjudication procedures or
unprofessional police. Consider several natural experiments.
In 2003, the then mayor of Mexico City, Manuel Lopez Obrador, and
billionaire Carlos Slim combined efforts to reduce crime in one of Mexico
City’s most notoriously lawless neighborhoods called Tepito.108 Under the
guidance of a security consulting firm run by former New York City Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani, Slim invested millions in bolstering security in order to
curb the violence, drug trafficking, and sale of stolen or counterfeit goods for
which the neighborhood was known.109 Surveillance cameras were installed
throughout the neighborhood, the number of police officers patrolling the
neighborhood increased enormously.110 Post-Giuliani law enforcement in
Tepito was characterized by “an aggressive approach to petty crime, with
increased arrests and stiff fines” as well as “zero tolerance” of graffitti and
broken windows.111 The Giuliani approach was viewed as largely illegitimate
because Giuliani was not an elected official and was seen as targeting
vulnerable Mexicans participating in the informal economy.112 Residents of
the neighborhood, including those who were not involved in any sort of
criminal group, resisted.113 In 2003, Tepito residents managed to drive off
1,200 police officers who approached Tepito with helicopters and armored
105
Richard Rosenfeld, Was There A ‘Ferguson Effect’ on Crime in St. Louis? THE SENTENCING
PROJECT 1 (June 11, 2015) https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FergusonEffect.pdf.
106
Juleyka Lantigua Williams, Has the ‘Ferguson Effect’ Finally Been Debunked?, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/has-the-ferguson-effect-finallybeen-debunked/502265; Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence
and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOCIO. REV. 857, 865 (2016) (finding
that 911 calls for service in Milwaukee dropped after the Michael Brown story broke); Rich
Morin & Renee Stepler, The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 29,
2016), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/09/29/the-racial-confidence-gap-in-police-performance
(in a 2016 survey conducted just after the shooting of Brown, just 14% of Black people reported that they
had a lot of confidence in their local police, and less than half said they had at least some confidence).
107
Philip J. Cook, Will the Current Crisis in Police Legitimacy Increase Crime? Research Offers a
Way Forward, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST 71, 71 (2015).
108
Andalusia Knoll, The Mexico City Barrio That Giuliani Couldn’t Conquer, VICE (March 7,
2013), https://www.vice.com/da/article/nn483w/tepito-is-mexico-citys-last-untamed-barrio.
109
Id.; Ibsen Martinez, Tepito’s Way, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY (Oct. 3, 2005), https://www.econlib.
org/library/Columns/y2005/MartinezTepito.html.
110
Knoll, supra note 108.
111
Matt Zapotosky & Karen DeYoung, How Rudy Giuliani’s Brand as a Crime-Fighting Mayor
Made Him Millions in Latin America, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/giuliani-abroad-selling-latin-america-on-his-crime-fightingpolicies/2016/11/21/8b0615c2-ac57-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html.
112
Katharyne Mitchell & Katherine Beckett, Securing the Global City: Crime, Consulting, risk, and
Ratings in the Production of Urban Space, 15 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 75, 96–97 (2008).
113
See generally MARKUS MICHAEL MÜLLER, THE PUNITIVE CITY: PRIVATIZED POLICING AND
PROTECTION IN NEOLIBERAL MEXICO (2016).
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vehicles.114 Since then, crime in the area has increased as Tepitans have
largely ignored the new police procedures.115 Eventually, the Mexican
government realized that the perceived illegitimacy of their new enforcement
mechanisms was doing more harm than good and decided to sever ties with
the American security personnel.116
Similarly, consider the experiences of various Native American tribes
whose tribal justice systems conflicted with the U.S. federal criminal justice
system. Before 1953, the federal government had allowed tribes to have
criminal justice jurisdiction over their reservations,117 but that year Congress
passed Public Law 280, which allowed states to decide whether to assume
complete or partial jurisdiction over crimes committed on reservations.118
The law was viewed as an affront to tribal sovereignty, as it failed to
recognize Native Americans’ status as members of domestic sovereign
nations and stifled the effectiveness of tribal courts.119 Over the following
decades, Native Americans developed increasingly negative views of the
non-Native American criminal justice system, stemming from widespread
distrust of the instruments of justice implemented by the federal government
in those cases where the states did not assume jurisdiction.120 As views
became more negative, crime soared.121
The situation in Northern Ireland during the 1970s provides another
example of the connection between perceived illegitimacy and increased
crime. As tensions rose between Catholics, who wanted a united Ireland, and
Protestants, who claimed allegiance to the United Kingdom, violence
escalated.122 In 1972, the British government suspended the Northern Ireland
parliament and instituted direct U.K. rule, replacing Irish criminal justice
policies with its own. Law enforcement powers were expanded enormously,
allowing for the indefinite detention of suspects without trial, juryless cases

114
115

GREGORY TREVERTON, FILM PIRACY, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORISM 108 (2009).
Karla Zabludovsky, Rudy Giuliani Was Paid Millions to Make Mexico City Safer And It May
Not Have Worked, BUZZFEED (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/karlazabludovsky/
rudy-giuliani-was-paid-millions-to-make-mexico-city-safer-an.
116
See Mitchell & Beckett supra note 112, at 98.
117
Barbara Perry, Impacts of Disparate Policing in Indian Country, 19 POLICING & SOC’Y 263, 269
(2009) (explaining that between 1823 and 1832, the Supreme Court decided “the Marshall Trilogy,” a
series of cases which determined that Native American tribes are domestic, dependent nations over whom
state laws can have no force).
118
See generally Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Public Law 280 and Law
Enforcement In Indian Country—RESEARCH PRIORITIES, RESEARCH IN BRIEF, NAT’L INST. JUST. 1, 4
(Dec. 2005), https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/public-law-280-and-law-enforcement-indian-count
ry-research-priorities-research.
119
See Public Law 280 and the Breakdown of Law in California Indian Country, UCLA AM. INDIAN
STUD. CTR., https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/ca/Tribes11.htm.
120
See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736
(2006) (explaining that non-Native prosecutors were seen as lacking the moral authority to act on behalf
of the community and as incapable of acting with community values in mind: “Given the long history of
federal-tribal relations, the federal prosecutor simply may not be anyone whom the community has any
reason to trust.”).
121
DAVID LESTER, CRIME AND THE NATIVE AMERICAN 26–28 (1999); Larry EchoHawk, Child
Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian Keeping in Mind the Seventh Generation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 99 (2001); Sarah Deer, Federal Indian Law and Violent Crime: Native Women
and Children at the Mercy of the State, 31 SOC. JUST. 17, 25 (2004) (“Many Indians distrust the legal and
social authorities that could be most helpful to them because of past experiences of unjust treatment.”).
122
NICOLA CARR, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN NORTHERN IRELAND 2–3 (2017).
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of alleged terrorism, and increased police and army powers.123 The British
police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was widely perceived as partial
to Protestant Loyalists and unaccountable to, and discriminatory against,
Catholic Unionists. As two criminologists observed, “[t]he costs in terms of
negative effects on public trust in British political institutions have been
incalculable.”124 Politically motivated crimes increased with the rise in
political tensions, but so did crimes unrelated to political action.125 As a result
of this perceived illegitimacy, throughout the 1970s, the levels of recorded
crime increased nearly sixfold.126 Murders rose rapidly, and property crime
increased at an even higher rate during this period.127 The burglary rate
increased by a factor of fifteen, and drug dealing rose exponentially.128 As
the Irish populace became more disaffected and distrusting of the influence
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, they expressed their disillusionment by—
among other things—committing more crime.129
5. Empirical Studies of the Law Enforcement
Legitimacy-Compliance Dynamic
One need not rely only on these natural experiments for evidence of the
connection between criminal justice legitimacy and compliance, though, as
there is also a strong body of empirical evidence that supports the
connection.
Most compelling here is the work of Tom Tyler.130 Tyler contends that
procedural fairness and trust in those enforcing the law, as opposed to the
perceived justness of laws governing criminal liability which Robinson
advances, promote criminal justice systems’ “legimitacy” or, as Robinson
similarly calls it, “moral credibility.”131 The two claims are analogous in that
they both suggest that a criminal justice system’s reputation can affect
compliance with it.132
In a 2002 study, Tyler and a colleague found that people were more
willing to voluntarily accept the decisions of judges when those decisions
appeared both neutral and respectful.133 If the decision-making process
123
See generally AOGÁN MULCAHY POLICING NORTHERN IRELAND: CONFLICT, LEGITIMACY AND
REFORM (2006).
124
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 127 (Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner
eds., 1997).
125
John Brewer et al., Crime in Ireland Since the Second World War, 27 J. OF THE STAT. & SOC.
INQUIRY SOC’Y OF IRE. 135, 148–161 (1996).
126
Aogán Mulcahy, The Impact of the Northern ‘Troubles’ on Criminal Justice in the Irish Republic,
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN IRELAND 280 (P. O’Mahony ed., 2008); see generally Ronald Weitzer, Policing
a Divided Society: Obstacles to Normalization in Northern Ireland, 33 SOC. PROBLEMS 41 (1985).
127
John Brewer, Bill Lockhart & Paula Rogers, Crime in Ireland Since the Second World War, 27 J.
STAT. & SOC. SOC’Y IRELAND 135, 144 (1996).
128
Mulcahy, supra note 126, at 282.
129
John Charles Murray, Born of the Troubles: Lessons in Trust and Legitimacy From the Police
Service of Northern Ireland 53–54 (Dec. 2017) (M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with
Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School).
130
See e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57 (2006) [hereinafter WHY PEOPLE
OBEY]; Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 95
(2004) [hereinafter Enhancing Police Legitimacy]; TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW
101 (Russell Sage Foundation 2002).
131
For a discussion of how Tom Tyler’s legitimacy and Robinson’s moral credibility compare and
interact, see generally Robinson & Bowers, supra note 1.
132
TYLER & HUO, supra note 130, at 101.
133
Id. at 64, 75.
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appeared to lack bias, focus on objective facts, recognize citizen rights, and
treat people with dignity, then people were more likely to defer to the
decisions of legal authorities.134 In a later paper, Tyler again examined the
relationship between procedural fairness and institutional trust, concluding
that
[people] depend heavily upon their inferences about the intentions of
the authority. If the authorities are viewed as having acted out of a
sincere and benevolent concern for those involved, people infer that
the authorities’ actions were fair. . . . People . . . have a strong desire
to view the authorities as benevolent and caring. This view is directly
tested during a personal encounter with those authorities, and people’s
views are powerfully shaped by whether they do, in fact, receive the
behavior they expect from the police or courts.135
Similarly, Tyler has found that law-abiding behavior can be encouraged
where police exercise their authority over citizens through fair processes and
with appropriate respect. In a study of adults in Chicago, for example, Tyler
assessed the independent impact on compliance of people’s perceptions of a
variety of factors, including felt obligation to obey the law and allegiance to,
or support for, the relevant authority.136 These two factors—which roughly
encapsulate perceived legitimacy of the justice system—were the single
most important determinants in people’s deference to the law. Similarly, in a
study of 1,656 adults in Oakland and Los Angeles, Tyler found that 30% of
the variance in subjects’ overall assessment of the justice system’s legitimacy
was derived from perceptions of their own interactions with the police.137
Ultimately, both studies suggest that the level of divergence between
people’s perceptions of how the police should act and their perceptions of
how the police actually act are some of the most important indicators of lawabiding behavior.138
A similar effect can be seen cross-culturally. In a study of South Korean
adults, researchers found that a perceived just distribution of encounters with
law enforcment and punishment was one of the strongest predictors of
compliance with the law.139 The study used data from surveys of “citizens’
attitudes and opinions towards the police and the law” and compared it to
their willingness to cooperate with law enforcement.140 One such exogenous
variable was distributive justice, which was measured by asking respondents
“the extent to which outcomes like pedestrian stops, traffic stops, and arrests
134
135
136
137
138

Id.
Enhancing Police Legitimacy, supra note 130.
TYLER & HUO, supra note 130, at 59.
WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 130, at 63.
What may be most interesting about Tom Tyler’s studies for our present purpose is that Tyler finds
that the effect in gaining compliance from increased moral credibility in getting the results right is nearly
three times more powerful than gaining compliance from increased legitimacy from having fair
procedures. See WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 130, at 59 (conceding that moral credibility has a greater
effect in shaping compliance than does legitimacy. Tyler reports that the relative weights of the factors
shaping compliance with the law are 0.33 for morality, 0.11 for legitimacy, and 0.02 for deterrence).
139
Youngki Woo, Edward R. Maguire & Jacinta M. Gau, Direct and Indirect Effects of Procedural
Justice on Cooperation and Compliance: Evidence from South Korea, 19 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 168,
175–76 (2018).
140
Id. at 172.
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[were] allocated in a just and unbiased manner.”141 The survey found that
respondents who perceived the police as allocating outcomes fairly were
more likely to comply with the law than those who viewed the police as
unjust in their dealings.142 An Australian study came to a related conclusion,
finding that people who viewed the police as encountering the public in a
procedurally just manner were more satisfied with law enforcement than
those who did not.143 “This link is primarily through the mediating influence
of police legitimacy, more so than judgments about the effectiveness of
police in crime control or the distribution of police services among
communities,” the researchers found.144
In conclusion, the evidence reported in the above subsections confirm
the common-sense notion that a reduction in the criminal justice system’s
reputation for being a reliable moral authority will correspondingly reduce
people’s willingness to defer to it, comply with its demands, and internalize
its norms. A host of real-world examples support this contention, including
American Prohibition, waning public support for the United States and
resistance to the draft during the Vietnam War, the anti-mask movement of
the 1918 Spanish Flu, overly aggressive policing and excessive punishment
in 1960s Watts, notorious corruption in New York at the turn of the twentieth
century, and Cold War-divided Berlin. Where the community critique of the
criminal justice system focuses on its contraventions of or failures to achieve
justice, it can spark vigilantism, like the police-targeted violence after the
death of George Floyd and the anti-protester conduct of the McCloskeys and
Kyle Rittenhouse, respectively. Even more compelling, however, may be the
significant collection of controlled empirical studies, both in the United
States and overseas, demonstrating the relationship between the criminal
justice system’s moral credibility with the community and its ability to gain
compliance, deference, and internalization.
B. A RESPONSE TO CRITICS
Some critics argue that there is little empirical evidence demonstrating
that a reduction in the moral credibility of a criminal justice system with the
community will reduce compliance with its laws.145 But this criticism simply
ignores the existing evidence recounted in the previous section—namely, the
empirical studies that show a clear association between reduced moral
141
142
143

Id. at 174–76.
Id.
Lyn Hinds & Kristina Murphy, Public Satisfaction with Police: Using Procedural Justice to
Improve Police Legitimacy, 40 AUS. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 27, 36 (2007).
144
Id.
145
See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 1153 (“In a country with active, if often contentious, discussions of
the boundary between public and private, it is not at all clear that citizens expect or demand a close
correspondence between the criminal law and their moral intuitions. And even if they do make that
demand, it is not at all clear that society gains more by indulging the demand . . . rather than ignoring
it.”); see also Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley Rubinstein, Putting Desert in its Place, STAN. L.
REV. 77, 123-124 (2013) (reporting the results of a study, which “suggests that a failure to track
community members’ views on punishment does not have a significant or lasting impact on their
willingness to be law-abiding citizens.”). However, Robinson and coauthors have critiqued this study and
its methodology and concluded, “With this study [Slogobin & Brinkley Rubinstein] have not undermined
empirical desert but rather confirmed it, giving it empirical support that it did not previously have.” Paul
H. Robinson, Joshua Samuel Barton & Matthew Lister, Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and
Limiting Retributivism, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 312, 340 (2014) [hereinafter Empirical Desert, Individual
Prevention].
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credibility and reduced compliance; the large collection of natural
experiments that show this dynamic at work in the real world across a wide
variety of situations and cultures; and the empirical research and real-world
case studies, conducted by social psychologists like Tom Tyler, that
document an analogous dynamic between a system’s reputation for fair
adjudication and police professionalism and compliance. There is also an
element of common sense with respect to both dynamics, given what is
understood about human nature. History is filled with examples of revolt and
rebellion against unfair and illegitimate rule, which evidence a fundamental
intuition: people are less likely to defer to authorities which they believe are
worthy or deserving of deference. Any assumption to the contrary would
imply that people will consent to being governed by authorities they view as
unjust. The critics have some work to do to discredit this considerable
amount of evidence and to propose viable alternative explanations for the
results of the empirical and natural case studies that support the credibilitycompliance dynamic. Since many continue to deny the link between criminal
justice systems’ reputations and citizens’ compliance generally, they also
need to provide an alternative explanation for the legitimacy-compliance
dynamic shown in the “legitimacy” empirical studies and natural
experiments.
Some critics point out that the research shows only a reduction in an
intention to comply, not actual reduced compliance.146 Again, this simply
ignores the existing evidence. It is true that social psychologists have not
been able to, and probably never will, create and conduct a controlled
experiment to directly prove the credibility-compliance dynamic. As
mentioned earlier, few governments are likely to let experimenters take over
their criminal justice system and degrade its moral credibility in order to
confirm a hypothesized increase in lawlessness. However, we already have
a large collection of natural experiments where a criminal justice system’s
moral credibility noticeably decreased because of current events, resulting in
a corresponding decrease in compliance among the public.147
Other critics suggest that any reduced compliance is likely to be limited
to particular laws that the community sees as lacking in moral credibility.148
146
See Roberts & de Keijser, supra note 2, at 489–90 (arguing that all of the experimental variables
are measures of attitudes and behavioral intentions, whereas empirical desert justifications make claims
about people’s behavior in response to the law and effectiveness of the criminal justice system: “The
reported studies measured subjects’ respect for the law, and their behavioural intentions to cooperate,
support and comply with the law. As such, these studies, on which the book’s claims rest, remain at the
level of attitudes and behavioural intentions of small samples of subjects undergoing experimental
manipulations . . . . In short, there is insufficient evidence for the effectiveness claims of empirical desert.
Studies which measure actual behaviour, not merely behavioural intentions, are necessary.”).
147
See supra Sections II.A.2, II.A.4.
148
See Rappaport, supra note 2, at 806–07 (arguing that evidence for compliance effects of empirical
desert is shaky because even though research indicates that people will be more willing to comply with a
particular law that aligns more closely with their views, it does not necessarily indicate that people will
comply with the law more generally: “In nearly all of the prior work Robinson cites, researchers
investigated whether a law’s moral credibility affects the stated likelihood of compliance with that law,
not with the law more generally . . . . [E]xisting research does not distinguish between the credibility of
outcomes in individual cases and that of the system as a whole. In other words, the data do not show
whether people regard a system as morally credible when outcomes an in individual cases are perceived
as just but the systemic effects are not. After all, sentences are not the only systemic input that matters—
budgets, police and prosecutorial discretion, and a host of other factors unrelated to sentencing go far
toward determining how much punishment the system doles out and to whom.”).
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Yet again, this is simply contrary to the existing evidence. The empirical
studies show that criminal liability or punishment that is perceived as unjust
makes subjects less willing to give deference, for example, by reporting a
different offense or interpreting conviction for a different offense as
suggesting the conduct is condemnable.149 Further, this criticism also
conflicts with the natural experiments described earlier, in which losses of
moral credibility in one area of the respective criminal justice systems led to
a increase in crime rates generally.150
Some critics argue that compliance decreases only where there is a
dramatic reduction in moral credibility.151 But this criticism is inconsistent
with the empirical data that shows that the relationship between the criminal
law’s moral credibility and the public’s compliance with it is not a step
function with trigger points but, rather, a continuous function: a marginal
reduction in moral credibility will produce a corresponding marginal
reduction in compliance.152 When subjects come into the laboratory, they
have already formed a view of their criminal justice system’s reputation,
based upon their exposure to media accounts, conversations with other
people, and so forth. In the period of time that they are in the laboratory,
researchers can, at most, nudge that view of the system in one direction or
another by virtue of the experiment’s design. Yet the evidence shows that
even this minor nudge results in a noticeable shift in subjects’ willingness to
comply, defer, and internalize. We know from empirical studies that ordinary
people have extremely nuanced judgments of relative blameworthiness.153 It
is not unreasonable to speculate that a person’s real-world exposure to a case
they see as moderately disproportionate could provide as much of a nudge
as the social scientist can provide by exposing the person to a case of greater
disproportionality in a social psychology laboratory. Given subjects’
nuanced judgments of disproportionality, any disproportionality will
contribute to their overall judgment of the system, and, as noted above, there
is not some trigger point at which the effect occurs but, rather, a continuous
function in which an incremental reduction in credibility produces an
incremental reduction in compliance.
Other critics suggest that if conflict with community views really
undermines compliance, then the criminal justice system should have
collapsed by now or at least shown signs that it is headed for collapse.154
149
150
151

See supra Section II.A.5.
See supra Sections II.A.2, II.A.4.
See Simons, supra note 2, at 662 (“[I]t does not follow that the failure of states to conform their
criminal legislation to their own constituents’ views will perceptibly undermine compliance with the law.
It might turn out that so long as the major corpus of the criminal law in each state is in very rough accord
with its citizens’ values, the power of internal moral sanctions will be maintained; discordance beyond
that threshold might have virtually no effect.”).
152
See supra Section II.A.5.
153
Robinson et al., supra note 1; Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 10, 35; Utility of Desert, supra
note 1.
154
See Roberts & de Keijser, supra note 2, at 488 (arguing that there is no evidence that large
segments of the community are deeply dissatisfied with the criminal justice system or that their
dissatisfaction plays out in their level of compliance with the law: “Our first question is whether the strong
form of his argument is overstated. The arguments for empirical desert appear intuitively attractive. The
argument predicts that without connecting to shared community intuitions the criminal justice system’s
moral credibility will continue to decline, eventually leading to system failure. From an empirical point
of view, this claim is problematic because it cannot be falsified by looking at existing criminal justice
systems—which have yet to collapse. Why, in light of long-standing public criticism, have existing
systems not yet lost all their moral credibility and collapsed? One answer may be that they are on the
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Again, this ignores the continuous-function relationship between moral
credibility and compliance. It is not the case that any reduction in moral
credibility will cause the criminal justice system to collapse. An incremental
reduction in reputation simply creates a corresponding incremental reduction
in compliance.155 Whatever the current state of a criminal justice system,
there is always value in attempting to improve its moral credibility, and there
is always a compliance cost in letting its moral credibility slip.
Some critics point out that the empirical research suggests a mild
reduction in compliance only upon exposing subjects to grossly
disproportionate sentences, and thus, these critics suggest that there would
be little real-world reduction in compliance from the run-of-the-mill
disproportionality more common in the system.156 This view is misguided
because it assumes that people in the real world would not be exposed to
grossly disproportionate punishments like those used in the studies. In fact,
the empirical studies identify a significant list of common criminal law
doctrines that regularly produce what the community sees as
disproportionate punishment: three strikes, felony murder, high penalties for
drug offenses, strict liability, adult prosecution of juveniles, criminalizing
regulatory violations, and narrowing the insanity defense.157 Further, many
of the natural experiments discussed earlier do not involve particularly
disproportionate, shocking cases but, rather, a continuing stream of lesser
disproportionalities which yield the cumulative effect of reduced moral
credibility and thereby increase crime.158
Some critics apparently concede that reduced moral credibility will lead
to some reduction in compliance but argue that it would take more research
brink of collapse and it is simply a matter of time until the moral credibility reservoir is completely
drained. The alternative explanation is that existing criminal justice systems already incorporate popular
opinion in more diffuse and indirect ways, at least to the extent that it has protected the systems against
total loss of moral credibility . . . . Moreover, there is a marked and fundamental difference between
observing that the community would (for example) support a difference in grading of an offence
depending on the degree of culpability and claiming that ignoring such community views will be
detrimental to the moral credibility and effectiveness of the justice system. Similarly, focusing on
justificatory defences (i.e., self-defence), Robinson concludes from one of his scenario studies that
striking differences between community views and the criminal law indicate that large segments of the
community are ‘deeply dissatisfied with the criminal justice system.’ While the observation of a marked
difference may be the result of empirical research, the stated implication is not.”) (citations omitted).
155
See supra Section II.A.6.
156
See Rappaport, supra note 2, at 807 (arguing that evidence detects only slight anticipated
compliance effects from massively unjust sentences—for present purposes, we presume that little to no
effect would arise from mild injustices and their associated diminution of moral credibility—“Robinson’s
own studies present lay participants with vignettes involving criminal sentences that, by conjecture, are
grossly disproportionate to anticipated views of just desert. Learning of these sentences, Robinson finds,
reduces participants’ expressed willingness to comply and cooperate with the law. Yet Robinson detects
only slight anticipated compliance effects from massively unjust sentences, such as a fifty-year sentence
for a nineteen-year-old who reasonably believed the minor with whom he had consensual sex was an
adult.”). See also Slobogin, supra note 2, at 378 (“Robinson appears to hold that failing to subscribe to
empirical desert in most cases will result in noticeable disutility, whereas I am inclined to believe, in line
with studies reported in Putting Desert in Its Place, that only significant, continuous and highly publicized
departures from lay views will occasion the loss of compliance, cooperation, and respect that Robinson
describes. People get upset about all sorts of things the government does—from Obamacare and
surveillance to gun control and abortion. Changing the official stance on controversial issues to appease
one group is likely to upset another. Whether the focus is criminal matters or something else, most people
will not take their disgruntlement out on the system or on others, and those who do will be roughly equal
in number regardless of which position government adopts.”). Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention,
supra note 145, at 340.
157
See INTUITIONS, supra note 1, at 127.
158
See supra Section II.A.1 (Watts, Prohibition, Vietnam War).
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to determine how much of a reduction it would create.159 These critics argue
that without this further research, it cannot be determined whether this crimecontrol mechanism would prove more or less effective than alternative
distributive principles such as incapacitation of the dangerous or general
deterrence.160 This is an important point, for if the justification for adopting
a distributive principle that maximizes moral credibility is its crime-control
advantages, then a comparison between its effectiveness and the
effectiveness of other crime-control distributive principles is essential. This
is the subject of Part VI, which concludes that the greatest strength of
maximizing moral credibility as a distributive principle may be the
sometimes disqualifying weaknesses of alternative crime-control principles.
III. THE DETERMINANTS OF MORAL CREDIBILITY
Part II has shown that reduced moral credibility tends to reduce
compliance, deference, and internalization. But one may still ask: what
determines the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community? There
are many aspects of a criminal justice system that contribute to its reputation,
including, as noted above with regard to Tom Tyler’s “legitimacy” research,
the fairness of its adjudication procedures and the professionalism of its
police. Our focus here is on the justice system’s criminal laws. How can a
distributive justice principle best promote and protect the justice system’s
moral credibility? We argue that this can typically be done best by
minimizing conflicts between criminal laws and the community’s justice
judgments.
A. CRIMINAL LAW’S REGULAR CONFLICTS WITH COMMUNITY
VIEWS UNDERMINE ITS MORAL CREDIBILITY
We know from empirical studies that ordinary people typically think of
criminal liability and punishment in terms of desert—the notion that
offenders should get the punishment they deserve rather than, for example,
the punishment that might best deter others or most effectively incapacitate
dangerous offenders. Consider, for example, two empirical studies that
explicitly tested the factors that drive ordinary people’s judgments about
criminal liability and punishment.
One study focused on whether ordinary people relied on general
deterrence or just desert as the basis for imposing criminal liability and
punishment.161 Participants were given short vignettes of harmdoing, which
159
160

See Improve Empirical Desert, supra note 2, at 452.
See id. (explaining empirical desert advocates have yet to show how much compliance empirical
desert can induce: “[W]e cannot use social science surveys alone to determine how much compliance
empirical desert will generate. To do that, we would have to engage in the very difficult process of
monitoring and analyzing the effects that empirical desert policies have on compliance behavior. We can
use surveys to test short-term effects of people’s beliefs about the law on their reported willingness to
comply with the law. But such studies will still be a far cry from delivering the sort of real-world data we
would need in order to estimate compliance induced by real-world empirical desert policies. Therefore,
we cannot operationalize empirical desert as part of a consequentialist punishment system until we can
better estimate how much compliance empirical desert policies induce.”). We, the authors, do not presume
to know if there are good consequentialist grounds for adopting potentially costly empirical desert
policies.
161
Kevin Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 284, 288 (2002).
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varied factors of the harmdoing that could affect the sentence.162 Subjects
were then asked to recommend punishment severity on two scales, ranging
from “not at all severe” to “extremely severe,” and then “not guilty” to “life
sentence.”163 With respect to each participant, the authors wrote, “The degree
to which his or her sentence recommendation was influenced by each of
these variables of wrongdoing provides a clue to the respondent’s underlying
motivation for the punishment given.”164 The variables used that would have
a significant influence on a general deterrence distribution of criminal
liability and punishment included the seriousness of the offense, the
difficulty of detecting the particular type of crime, and in the publicity that
the sentence received.165 These variables are all highly relevant in assessing
liability and punishment based upon general deterrence.166 The variables
used that would be highly relevant to a desert distribution included the
seriousness of the offense; conditions of moral mitigation, such as, for
example, whether or not the offender expressed remorse; and whether or not
the offender committed their crime for ostensibly noble purposes.167 Several
studies were conducted using these basic parameters, controlling for various
components to determine the validity of the results.168 In their responses,
participants appeared insensitive to general deterrence factors but highly
sensitive to blameworthiness factors.169 Although participants expressed
support for deterrence as a general goal of having criminal justice system on
an abstract level, they failed to assign punishment in a way that was
consistent with it as a distributive principle for criminal liability and
punishment.
Another study tested whether ordinary people are more inclined to assign
criminal liability and punishment according to either just desert criteria or
criteria relevant to the theory of incapacitation of dangerous persons.170
Subjects in the study were given descriptions of various crimes and were
asked to assign corresponding punishments on a seven-point Likert-type
scale that gave a general range for severity and on a more elaborate thirteenpoint scale that provided actual prison sentences.171 In the various vignettes,
the seriousness of the crime, as well as the likelihood that the actor would
commit other harms in the future, were altered.172 The authors examined the
weight that subjects placed on just desert or incapacitation considerations as
they assigned punishments to wrongdoers.173 The results indicated that
respondents’ natural inclinations more closely resembled just desert
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 287–89.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 288–89.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 288–95.
Id. at 289.
John Darley, Kevin Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives
for Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 659 (2000) (defining “incapacitation” as “suggest[ing] that a
wong-doer’s likelihood of committing future offenses should be the primary determinant of present
punishment. This tends to assume that during the punishment period, the wrong-doer is prevented from
committing other harmful actions.”).
171
Id. at 661, 663.
172
Id. at 661–62.
173
Id. at 660.
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judgements than incapacitation judgments.174 The authors concluded that
“[t]he seriousness of the act, indexed in large part by the degree of moral
outrage it provokes, determined the degree of punishment respondents
assigned to the act.”175
In a second part of the study, respondents were given three test cases,
where differing facts in each test case suggested varying levels of criminal
intent, to determine whether respondents’ motivation in assigning
punishment was to incapacitate a dangerous offender or to dole out just
deserts.176 “In each case,” the authors explained, “a previously mildmannered individual attacked and killed another person.”177 In the first case,
the offender killed the victim in a rage arising out of work-related jealousy;
in another, the offender killed a stranger because a previously undetected
inoperable brain tumor created violent tendencies; and in the last, the
offender killed a stranger due to the same brain tumor, but the tumor was
operable, so the offender later returned to his normal, nonviolent self after
receiving treatment.178 After reading the vignettes about the three offenders,
the subjects were asked whether they would recommend incarceration in a
prison, time in a mental hospital, or setting the person free.179 In the jealous
rage case, a strong majority of subjects (86%) recommended prison, as desert
would require.180 In the brain tumor cases, where a majority of respondents
saw the tumor as responsible for the offense rather than the actor, few
subjects recommended prison, whether the tumor was inoperable (7%) or
operable (21%).181 The vast majority of respondents again saw criminal
punishment, such as imprisonment, as appropriate only where they saw the
offender as blameworthy for the offense; in other words, they regarded
dangerousness as appropriate to civilly commit the person to an institution
but not to be used as a basis for criminal liability and punishment.
In a 2006 study, researchers found that people are intuitively drawn to
desert-related or “retribution” information when tasked with distributing
punishment.182 Subjects in the study were asked to assign prison sentences
to hypothetical offenders after selecting one of nine types of information—
all either desert-related, deterrence-related, or incapacitation-related—which
they believed would be most useful in their deliberations.183 A whopping
97% of subjects chose to consult desert-related information rather
deterrence-related or incapacitation-related information.184 When the same
subjects were asked to rate their confidence in their choices, those who had
consulted desert materials were substantially more confident in their
sentencing decisions than those who consulted general deterrence or
incapacitation materials, indicating that they believed they had made poor
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id. at 673 tbl.2.
Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment, 42 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 437, 437 (2006).
183
Id. at 444.
184
Id. at 445.
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choices.185 Thus, subjects were most inclined toward and comfortable with
their desert instincts.
In another study from 2006, a narrower examination of desert impulses
found that people are unlikely to endorse a system of restorative justice that
lacks retributive features.186 The study asked subjects to read vignettes of
various crimes and recommend a justice procedure for each criminal act.187
The first procedure was purely restorative, with no punitive elements; the
second was mixed; and the third was a traditional court procedure, which
was purely punitive.188 Participants were then asked to assign a sentence to
the crimes for which they recommended mixed or traditional court
procedures.189 The authors of the study found that people generally ascribed
punishment according to desert principles.190 For the crime of rape, for
example, none of the respondents accepted a purely restorative system.191
The authors explained that the study’s findings “suggest that in order for
citizens to view restorative justice as an acceptable alternative to the
traditional court system for serious crimes, the procedure must allow for the
option of retributive measures.”192
In a 2008 study, researchers found that self-reported justifications for
punishment bear little relation to actual punishment-related behavior,
revealing a subconcious inclination among most participants to punish on
desert grounds.193 Participants completed an anonymous online survey in
which they were asked to sentence offenders for various crimes and identify
whether the reasons for their sentences were retribution- or deterrencebased.194 Some scenarios were manipulated to ilicit greater or lesser
punishment for participants motived by desert, while others were
manipulated to do the same for participants motivated by deterrence.195
Participants then completed two further surveys that assessed the extent to
which each participant endorsed just desert, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.196 The results showed that people’s self-reported punishment
justifications did not at all align with their actual punishment-related
decisions.197 Even though people expressed support for deterrence-related or
incapacitation policies, they abandoned these policies as soon as they
realized that such policies failed to track blameworthiness proportionality.198
It seems clear from this research that ordinary people normally expect
and want criminal liability and punishment to be distributed according to an
offender’s just desert, rather than according to principles of general
185
186

Id. at 446.
Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Restoration and Retribution: How Including Retributive
Components Affects the Acceptability of Justice Procedures, 19 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 395, 395 (2006).
187
Id. at 400.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 404.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 406 tbl.1 & fig.1, 407.
192
Id. at 424.
193
Kevin M. Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions, 21
SOC. JUSTICE RSCH. 119 (2008).
194
Id. at 123–24.
195
Id. at 123.
196
Id. at 124.
197
Id. at 127.
198
Id. at 131.
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deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Thus, where offenders are
over- or under-punished in relation to laypeople’s intuitions of an appropriate
just desert-based punishment, one would expect laypeople to view the
punishment as unjust.
Given the studies showing people’s expectations and desires for the
distribution of criminal liability and punishment, do criminal law rules that
regularly conflict with the community’s justice judgments by doing injustice
or by failing to do justice undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility?
Again, the answer seems a matter of common sense. How could repeated
conflicts with the community’s shared principles of justice not reduce the
law’s credibility with the community?
However, once again, we need not strictly rely on common sense because
social psychology studies clearly confirm this dynamic. Some of the studies
described above in Part II(A) have already addressed this issue. For example,
the “disillusionment” condition in several studies was created, at times quite
successfully, by having subjects read about real-world cases wherein the
relevant criminal laws produced results that conflicted with community
justice judgments. The studies did not assume that exposing the subjects to
cases that conflicted with their justice judgments undermined their
perception of the system’s moral credibility. They actually tested for and
measured the corresponding loss in moral credibility.199
In a 1986 study, researchers interviewed over one thousand prison
inmates, asking them to rate the fairness of their trial and sentence in order
to determine the basis of offenders’ perceptions of the fairness of criminal
justice system outcomes more generally.200 The researchers defined one
possible basis, distributive fairness, as “the perception that the outcome is
deserved when judged not in relation to the amount of harm done, but rather
in relation to the comparisons between one’s own outcome and the outcomes
incurred by others.”201 The inmates were asked to rate the fairness of their
sentences on five-point Likert scales from “very fair” to “very unfair.”202
Notably, the inmates’ judgments of the relative fairness of the outcomes of
their own cases had a greater impact than the actual magnitude of their
sentences on inmates’ perceptions of the criminal justice system’s outcome
fairness overall.203 These results suggested that “routine departures from
legalistic principles of due process create in the consumer a sense of injustice
that undermines the legitimacy of legal authorities and thereby allows
justification for past criminal activity and increases the likelihood of future
criminality.”204 The researchers explained that perceived unfairness resulting
from informal and discretionary procedures can call the justice system’s
credibility into question.205
In a similar 1988 study, researchers interviewed hundreds of male
defendants charged with felonies shortly after their arrest and after the
199
200

See supra Section II.A.
Jean M. Landis & Lynne Goodstein, When Is Justice Fair? An Integrated Approach to the
Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, 11 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 675, 685–86 (1986).
201
Id. at 678.
202
Id. at 686.
203
Id. at 704.
204
Id. at 676–77.
205
Id. at 676.
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disposition of their case in order to determine what factors most strongly
influenced their level of satisfaction with the outcome.206 The sentences
received by the men ranged from time served to actual prison terms.207 The
men were asked about the severity of their sentences, measured by three
factors: 1) months incarcerated, 2) sentence type, and 3) deviation from
expected sentence.208 The defendants’ severity evaluations were compared
with their answers to questions regarding distributive justice—focusing on
defendants’ evaluations of how their sentences compared with those of
similar defendants convicted of the same crimes—as well as procedural
justice—focusing on the defendants’ perceptions of the fairness of the
process.209 The study found that defendants had more satisfaction with the
outcome of their case and trust in the criminal justice system when they felt
that their sentence was fair.210
In a 1972 study, dozens of defendants were interviewed about their
perceptions of fairness of the sentences they received.211 The study found
that the defendants focused most intently on the plea bargaining process,
which specifically involves making the best possible bargain and arranging
a quick release.212 The defendants felt that the plea bargaining process
exemplified the “lying” and “deceitfulness” of the system writ large because
sentencing depended not on deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution, but
rather on the “way the bargaining game is played.”213 They told researchers
that the process was just a “ritual” by which the smart defendants were able
to totally evade punishment.214 Plea bargaining made the men more
distrustful of the system because it reminded them of the criminal
environments that many of them came from.215 The author of the study
concluded that the plea bargaining process effectively undercut the moral
authority of the criminal justice system and contributed to defendant
cynicism.216
Several studies make an analogous point in the context of establishing
or undermining the legitimacy of police. For example, in 2008, Professor
Tracey Meares and her colleagues conducted a nationwide study of how the
public judges the appropriateness of police conduct.217 One component of
the study was a questionnaire inquiring into citizens’ perceptions and
evaluations of police-citizen encounters from their own experience. Another
component was an experiment testing citizens’ perceptions and evaluations
of police-citizen interactions from videos they were shown, wherein the
206
Johnathan D. Casper, Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. &
SOC. REV. 438, 487–88 (1988).
207
Id. at 488.
208
Id. at 490.
209
Id. at 491.
210
See id. at 494.
211
See JONATHAN CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE xii
(Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972); Clarence C. Kegel, Jr. & Timothy S. Hardy, Review: American Criminal
Justice: The Defendant’s Perspective by Jonathan D. Casper, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (1973).
212
Id. at 41.
213
Id. at 83.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 171–72.
216
Id. at 173.
217
Tracey L. Meares, Tom R. Tyler & Jacob Gardener, Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople
Perceive Good Policing, 105 J. CRIM. L. & Criminology 297, 321 (2015).
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police exercised varying modes of authority over the person they stopped,
including verbal commands and physical force.218 After watching the videos,
respondents evaluated the fairness of the police-citizen encounters by
answering questions such as “Did the police act neutrally?” and “Were the
police respectful?”219 Controlling for race, age, and gender, the authors found
that the perceived legitimacy of police is largely based on how people see
officers exercising their authority and their professionalism during policecitizen encounters.220 “[Where] officers listen to people, explain the basis of
their actions, treat them respectfully, and acknowledge people’s concerns in
the situation, they are trusted and viewed as acting professionally,” the
authors concluded.221
The empirical studies reported here confirm the common-sense notion
that regular conflicts with community views on the fair allocation of criminal
liability and punishment will reduce the justice system’s moral credibility.
They additionally confirm that regular conflicts with community notions of
fairness and professionalism in adjudication and policing will reduce the
system’s legitimacy.
B. A RESPONSE TO CRITICS
Most critics have not explicitly disputed the claim that regular conflicts
with a community’s justice judgments undermine a criminal justice system’s
moral credibility.222 Some expressly concede it,223 but others have argued that
ordinary people look to a host of social and cultural factors other than desert
in judging appropriate criminal liability and punishment. Thus, conflicts with
community justice judgments would not necessarily be disillusioning.
Indeed, a failure to deviate from community justice judgments could itself
be disillusioning in cases where the community relies upon non-desert
factors in judging appropriate criminal liability and punishment.224 But this
218
219
220
221
222
223

Id.
Id. at 322.
See id. at 316.
Id.
Rappaport, Sigler, Denno, and Kolber do not analyze the issue.
Ristroph explicitly concedes the point. “Alternatively, one could argue (as Robinson does) that
whatever the metaphysical status of desert, the criminal justice system will control crime more effectively
if it corresponds to popular beliefs about desert. That seems plausible. But remember: beliefs about desert
are not fixed independently of sentencing policy. When community intuitions fail to correspond to policy,
it is not obvious which should or will change to match the other . . . . Desert rhetoric need not be fatal to
reform, because desert is elastic. If we do scale back criminal sentences, and if we can generate popular
support for such sentencing reforms, desert conceptions will adjust to view the new sentences as
appropriate.” New Desert, supra note 2, at 49.
224
See Slobogin, supra note 2, at 386–87, 393 (arguing that people look to factors other than moral
blameworthiness when asked to assign punishment: “Desert certainly plays a role in lay persons’
decisions about punishment (a conclusion that a number of our studies support), but it is not the sole
consideration. If that is so, creating a criminal justice system that orders punishment solely on the basis
of desert may create dissatisfaction with the criminal law, which is something Robinson wants to avoid.
However, [Paul Robinson, Joshua Barton, and Matthew Lister] also state that the facts that we thought
would suggest a greater or lesser need for preventive sanctions—namely, prior crimes, a willingness to
undergo treatment, apology and restitution, and a vow to recidivate—are also consistent with desert.”);
see also Slobogin supra note 2 at 393 (“[W]hat [Paul Robinson, Joshua Barton, and Matthew Lister] are
calling the ‘moral credibility’ of the law may also hinge on the law’s allegiance to prevention factors
independently of desert factors . . . All of this could be beside the point if divergence from the modal
punishment assigned by lay people has little or no effect on the moral credibility of the law, or if any such
effect it does have does not lead to serious real-world impacts in terms of compliance, cooperation, and
related desideratum.”).
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criticism simply ignores the empirical evidence that ordinary people
primarily focus on desert in assessing the appropriate criminal liability and
punishment, at the exclusion of other criteria that might conflict with desert,
as the studies described in the previous section show.225
Even if one found that citizens were willing to compromise their
commitment to desert by taking some non-desert criteria into account, such
as fear for one’s own personal safety, it hardly follows that this deviation
from desert would boost the criminal justice system’s moral credibility. On
the contrary, citizens might well see the deviation as an unfortunate practical
compromise for their safety—hardly something that they would be proud of,
and hardly something that would improve the system’s moral credibility in
their view. (The empirical studies suggest that people might prefer to
preserve the criminal justice system’s focus strictly on desert by, for
example, utilizing civil commitment to protect society from dangerous,
blameless persons, rather than doing justice.)
One critic argues that there are a number of factors, beyond unjust
results, that can affect the criminal justice system’s overall reputation.226 We
completely agree. As we noted in Part II, for example, a criminal justice
system’s reputation for fair adjudication and professional policing will affect
its overall reputation. One can call it the system’s “legitimacy,” as Tom Tyler
does, or can include it in the system’s “moral credibility” as this critic seems
to. But there is nothing in this critique that takes away from the value of
generally tracking community justice judgments to maximize the system’s
moral credibility within the community. Deference, compliance, and
internalization can be increased by improving the system’s reputation. The
fact that procedural fairness and police professionalism can help does not
detract from the fact that doing justice and avoiding injustice in allocating
punishment can also help.227 Indeed, as noted above, the empirical evidence
suggests that these two forces tend to reinforce one another.228
Another critic argues that “[t]here is no good reason why empirical
desert should induce compliance among laypeople if they are true
retributivists.”229 In other words, it’s not empirical data about the
community’s views that matters to people, but rather their own views about
what is just. But we have never argued that the ordinary person is a good
consequentialist who will support empirical desert because of its crime225
Slobogin relies upon his own study as showing that people do not necessarily think about
punishment in terms of just deserts. Slobogin, supra note 2. at 386–87 (“Desert certainly plays a role in
lay persons’ decisions about punishment (a conclusion that a number of our studies support), but it is not
the sole consideration.”). However, as Robinson and coauthors have shown in their response to Slobogin's
article, a close examination of Slobogin's methodology and results suggest that they, in fact, support
Robinson's claim rather than undermine it. Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, supra note 145, at
340.
226
See Rappaport, supra note 2, at 807 (“There is an additional concern with the moral credibility
argument: existing research does not distinguish between the credibility of outcomes in individual cases
and that of the system as a whole. In other words, the data do not show whether people regard a system
as morally credible when outcomes in individual cases are perceived as just but the systemic effects are
not. After all, sentences are not the only systemic input that matters—budgets, police and prosecutorial
discretion, and a host of other factors unrelated to sentencing go far toward determining how much
punishment the system doles out and to whom.”).
227
See WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 130, at 59 (reporting the relative weight of the factors shaping
compliance with the law as 0.33 for personal morality, 0.11 for legitimacy, and 0.02 for deterrence).
228
See supra Section II.A.4.
229
See Improve Empirical Desert, supra note 2, at 454–55.
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control benefits. On the contrary, the ordinary person is more inclined to
comply with a criminal law that, by their own standards of just deserts, does
justice and avoids injustice. Our conclusions may be based on a data-driven
empirical desert, but ordinary people will experience the results of an
empirically-based system of desert, not as a social scientific program, but as
as true deontological desert.
This critic wants to claim that this is a form of “exploitation” of ordinary
people,230 because one is pretending that the system is retributivist (based on
deontological desert) when, in fact, it is consequentialist (based upon
empirical desert). But while this philosopher is concerned about whether
enacted criminal laws are properly motivated—by the retributive reasoning
of deontological desert rather than the consequentialist reasoning of
empirical desert—are we to assume that ordinary people care, or even
understand, the difference? To them, the results of a law are either just or not.
The theoretical motivations of a lawmaker for creating a rule have no
practical relevance for ordinary people.
IV. CONSTRUCTING A DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE THAT
PROMOTES MORAL CREDIBILITY BY MINIMIZING
CONFLICTS WITH COMMUNITY VIEWS
One might conclude that there is indeed crime-control value in trying to
maximize criminal law’s moral credibility with the community by generally
tracking empirical desert but nonetheless conclude that such a practice is not
possible, or at least not practical. How could such a maximize-moralcredibility distributive principle be constructed?
A. TRACKING EMPIRICAL DESERT
One can imagine any number of potential obstacles to constructing this
distributive principle. Perhaps justice judgments are so complex that
everyone simply has their own idiosyncratic view on every issue? Perhaps
people’s justice judgments are just general, vague notions—nothing that
could be used to develop specific rules for a criminal code or sentencing
guidelines? Perhaps the proposed distributive principle is unrealistic because
people’s justice judgments are constantly changing, and this makes it
impractical or at least expensive to maintain?
Is justice such a complex judgment that everybody simply has their own
personal view about everything? The empirical evidence suggests
otherwise.231 On some issues, there is, in fact, a high degree of agreement
across demographics.232 Many of these issues might be called the “core of
wrongdoing” because they concern such fundamental offenses as causing
physical injury to others, taking another’s property without consent, and
being deceitful in exchanges. Consider one study that had subjects rank
twenty-four scenarios according to their overall blameworthiness. The kinds
of offenses in the scenarios represent 94.9% of the offenses committed in the
230
Id. 453–54.
231
INTUITIONS,
232

Id.

supra note 1, at 18–34.
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United States.233 The results show a Kendall’s W234 of 0.95 for in-person
subjects and 0.88 for internet subjects—an astounding result.235 Researchers
cannot normally get this level of agreement among participants except in
observational studies, such as a study asking subjects to judge the relative
brightness of dot clusters. When subjects are asked to judge something
beyond the purely observational, the analytical task must be almost
intuitional to produce such a high level of agreement.
Are people's justice judgments just general vague notions, nothing that
could be used to produce the specific rules required by a criminal code or
sentencing guidelines? The empirical studies suggest that even uneducated
people have very sophisticated and nuanced judgments about justice, and
small changes in fact produce predictable changes in blameworthiness
judgments.236 People tend not to tie a particular level of blameworthiness to
a particular punishment level, but they can distinguish between many cases
along the blameworthiness continuum. Because the punishment continuum
contains a finite number of points, people’s judgments about the relative
blameworthiness of a case against all other cases end up putting the case at
a particular point on the punishment continuum. This is not because there is
some magical connection between that amount of blameworthiness and that
amount of punishment, but rather because that single point on the
punishment continuum places the case in its proper ordinal rank in relation
to all other cases. If the endpoint of the punishment continuum changes, so,
too, will the location of each case on the punishment continuum.
The endpoint of the punishment continuum is not something on which
people’s judgments are fixed. We see significant endpoint differences among
different societies, which confirms how malleable people’s judgments about
the endpointof the punishment continuum are.237 Judgments of relative
blameworthiness, in contrast, especially concerning the core of wrongdoing,
are not so malleable. This is confirmed by the fact that we find the same rank
ordering for most crimes across demographics and cultures.238
This high level of agreement on relative blameworthiness for crimes
falling within the core of wrongdoing is not surprising because people’s
justice judgments are, in some significant part, influenced by human
evolutionary development.239 And this is consistent with evidence suggesting
that many justice judgments are the product of intuition rather than of
conscious reasoning.240

233
The offenses in the scenarios, which are the most common offenses committed in the United
States, include: sexual assault, 0.8% of all offenses; robbery, 2.5%; assault, 19.0%; household burglary,
14.0%; and theft 58.6%. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2003
Statistical Tables 14 tbl.1 (2005).
234
The Kendall’s W is a type of statistic used to assess agreement among participants who complete
a rating task. It ranges from 0—no agreement, or total randomness—to 1—complete agreement, or total
unanimity among the participants. See MAURICE G. KENDALL, RANK CORRELATION METHODS 118
(Oxford 1990).
235
INTUITIONS, supra note 1, at 27, 52.
236
For a wide range of such studies, see supra Part III.
237
INTUITIONS, supra note 1, at 18–34.
238
Id. at 23.
239
Id. at 35–62.
240
Id. at 5–17.
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As one looks outside the core of wrongdoing, disagreements among
people do appear. Downloading music from the internet without a license
can be seen as analogous to traditional theft but is not a physical taking
without consent. Thus, while there may be strong agreement on issues
relating to physical takings, there will still be disagreement on the
downloading issue depending on the extent to which one accepts the analogy
between unlicensed downloading and traditional theft.
Given that there is disagreement on some issues, doesn’t that mean that
it is simply impossible to track community views? No. As the studies cited
in Part II make clear, there is no trigger point of moral credibility below
which a criminal justice system will collapse. Rather, the credibilitycompliance relationship is a continuous one. Any loss of credibility—for
example, if a law adopts a majority view, thereby causing incremental
disillusionment among the minority—will create some corresponding
incremental loss in compliance. But this incremental loss in credibility with
the minority on an issue does not alter the value of trying to maximize moral
credibility with as much of the community as possible.
The critical point here is that tracking empirical desert is generally the
best approach to building moral credibility with the community. The real
question for drafters of criminal codes and sentencing guidelines is what
position will cause the least alienation and disillusionment among the
population.
In some cases, this may not be the strict majority view. One can imagine
an issue in which the majority holds one view but without much strength of
feeling, and a significant minority holds a contrary view with very strong
feelings. A criminal law that conflicts with the minority view would
necessarily suffer a significant loss of moral credibility. Thus, under the right
circumstances, criminal code or sentencing guideline drafters can best
protect and promote the system’s moral credibility by adopting the minority
view.
Perhaps the proposed distributive principle cannot realistically be
operationalized because people’s justice judgments are constantly changing,
and this makes it impractical or at least expensive to maintain such a
distributive principle. However, the vast majority of issues addressed in
criminal codes or sentencing guidelines do not change—this is certainly true
of criminal law’s core principles of wrongdoing and blameworthiness241—
and issues that do change tend to shift slowly. In the last decade or two, we
have seen a variety of developments resulting in changes to the law,
including the decriminalization of same-sex marriage, the increased
criminalization of sexual assaults, and new offenses required by advances in
technology. While this latest period has been a whirlwind of activity
compared to previous eras, even these latest developments represent a new
trivial portion of the issues that need to be decided by criminal code or
sentencing guideline drafters.242
241
242

Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 145–75.
See generally Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law’s Core Principles (forthcoming 2021), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2251 (explaining people’s judgments on core principles
such as, “greater harm deserves greater punishment,” “harm to persons is more wrongful than harm to
property,” and “an actor who lacks the capacity to know his conduct is wrong or to avoid committing it
is not blameworthy.”).
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B. A RESPONSE TO CRITICS WITH RESPECT TO THE
FEASABILITY OF THE PROJECT
We have already noted and responded to several sorts of criticisms about
the feasibility of constructing a criminal code or sentencing guidelines based
upon a distributive principle of maximizing moral credibility. First, the claim
that such a project is not possible because there is no such thing as the
community view243—essentially the argument that everyone disagrees about
everything—is simply not consistent with empirical evidence. The
significant agreement across demographics on many core principles was
hidden from us for some time because the agreement concerned the rank
ordering of cases, while researchers were focused instead on levels of
severity. That is, while different communities might disagree on how
severely to punish murder, they generally agree that murder deserves more
punishment than rape, which in turn deserves more punishment than theft,
and so on.
Second, the claim that constructing a criminal liability and punishment
system based upon community justice judgments is not possible because
people’s judgments are only rough, general feelings,244 is simply inconsistent
with the evidence. People’s blameworthiness judgments, even people with
little or no education, are generally nuanced and sophisticated. Ordinary
people may not be very good at articulating the blameworthiness principles
that they use, but even small changes in the offense situation can produce
significant and predictable changes in people’s justice assessment.
Third, some critics have argued that the existence of controversial issues
creates intractable problems for the project.245 Other critics relatedly argue
that the existence of issues upon which there are disagreements within the
community means that by accommodating the views of one group one is
necessarily alienating the other group.246
These criticisms also fail to capture the bigger picture. It is easy for
academics, in particular, to focus on the points of controversy—such as
disagreements about the legalization of same-sex marriage or about some
other hot issue of the day—but drafters of criminal codes and sentencing
guidelines have thousands of issues to deal with, very few of which are
controversial. The primary work of a distributive principle is to answer each

243
See Slobogin, supra note 2, at 392 (explaining that his study found that “disagreement . . . was
remarkably high.”).
244
See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive
Criminal Law, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 324 (1996) (noting that the community of individuals
that have been tested is “generally uninformed—both in the sense that it has not thought deeply about the
relevant issues, and in the sense that it does not know the legal context in which a given legal provision
operates.”).
245
See Ristroph, supra note 2, at 1160–61 (“Much of Robinson’s work addresses the implications of
moral intuitions for sentencing choices—how much to punish. Legal moralism, at least as represented in
contemporary references to the Hart-Devlin debate, seems to be primarily an argument about
criminalization—whether certain conduct, such as same sex intimacy between consenting adults, should
be exempt from criminal regulation altogether. Robinson has written relatively little about controversial
morals-based criminal prohibitions.”).
246
See Slobogin, supra note 2, at 378 (“Changing the official stance on controversial issues to
appease one group is likely to upset another.”).
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of those thousands of diverse issues.247 In the real world, the work of the
criminal justice system that forms ordinary people’s judgments about the
justness of its results involves a lot more than the hot issue of the day.
It is true that a particularly controversial issue requires the special
attention of code and sentencing guideline drafters. The greater the media
attention an issue receives, the greater its potential for undermining the
system’s moral credibility, at least in the short term with regard to that issue.
It is the long-term reputation of the system, of course, that matters in people’s
assessment of the system’s reliability as a moral authority, but its handling
of the hotly contested issues remains important.
Does the existence of such a controversial issue present an existential
threat to maximizing moral credibility as a distributive principle? We argue
that it does not. The analytical process for criminal code and sentencing
guideline drafters would be the same as with any other of the thousands of
issues on which they must take a position. What position will most
effectively promote and protect the criminal law’s moral credibility with the
community? As noted above, this may not be simply a matter of adopting the
majority view.
V. PHILOSOPHICAL, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL
OBJECTIONS TO EMPIRICAL DESERT
AS A DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE
The previous sections have responded to critics’ attacks on the key
elements supporting the proposed distributive principle: that reduced moral
credibility incrementally reduces the criminal law’s crime-control
effectiveness, that regular conflicts with community justice judgments
reduce the criminal law’s moral credibility, and that it is feasible to use such
a distributive principle to construct a criminal code, sentencing guidelines,
and sentencing policy directives. But critics have offered a series of other
criticisms that go beyond these points based on their philosophical, political,
or ideological preferences.
A. THE PROPOSED DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE WOULD
NECESSARILY PRODUCE DRACONIAN SENTENCES
A common critique is that relying on community views would produce
a draconian system of punishment, and one need only look at the current state
of criminal liability and punishment doctrines to confirm this. Today’s
punishment system is quite harsh as it is, and as one critic points out, “A
majority of the country continues to support the death penalty and still
believes that courts are too lenient. Well under 20% of Americans think that
247
These issues include, but are not limited to, criminalizing risk-creating behavior, the objective
requirements of complicity, omission liability, desistance and renunciation in attempt, use of deadly force
in self-defense, use of force in defense of property, citizens’ law enforcement authority, offense culpability
requirements and mistake defenses, culpability requirements for complicity, voluntary intoxication, the
individualization of the objective standard of negligence, formulations of the insanity defense, the
immaturity defense, the involuntary intoxication defense, the duress defense, the entrapment defense,
grading distinctions among sexual offenses, the felony murder rule, causation requirements, and
punishment for multiple offenses. Empirical studies on ordinary people’s justice judgments already exist
for every issue on this list, if only in their early stages. See INTUITIONS, supra note 1, at 239–401.
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prison conditions are too harsh.”248 In light of people’s apparently draconian
beliefs about punishment, “populism makes criminal justice more, not less,
severe,” this critic argues.249 “The movements to rein in [indeterminate
sentencing as a mechanism of mercy] were fueled by the same distrust of
experts and elites that the democratizers espouse today, boosted by harsh
popular views.”250
But this criticism confuses populism generally with the narrower
proposal that criminal laws should be constructed to avoid conflicts with
community justice judgments. The empirical evidence shows that ordinary
people, as opposed to politicians and political advocates, do not, in fact, have
the draconian sensibilities that the critics assume they do.
Consider, for example, a study that tested ordinary people’s views on a
wide variety of current crime-control doctrines, including felony murder, the
three-strikes rule, the criminalization of regulatory violations, the narrowing
of the insanity defense, high penalties for drug offenses, adult prosecution of
juveniles, and the use of strict liability. Subjects were given scenarios
describing twelve real-world cases that illustrate the operation of one of these
crime-control doctrines. The research reveals that these doctrines clearly do
not reflect community views—just the opposite: they dramatically conflict
with them.251 They may well be consistent with the coercive crime-control
strategies of general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous, but they
have the effect of disconnecting criminal punishment from community
notions of justice.
In the study, subjects were asked to rank order twelve modern crimecontrol cases and twelve “milestone” cases—cases that previous research has
shown provide milestones along the full length of the punishment continuum
with a high degree of agreement across demographics. The rank order of the
twenty-four cases shows just how serious the respondents thought the crimecontrol cases were in relation to each of the milestone cases. Subjects
perceived the conduct at issue in the crime-control cases, which have
draconian legal penalties in the real world, as being dramatically less serious
and blameworthy than the law treats them. For example, in one case where
the three-strikes doctrine was applied in a minor fraud offense that ultimately
resulted in a life sentence for the offender, the subjects viewed the overall
deserved punishment as somewhat more serious than stealing a microwave
from a house and somewhat less serious than a minor assault at a record
store. The subjects gave sentences of 2.3 years and 3.9 years for these
offenses, respectively—significantly less than the life sentence that the
fraudster received.
The size of the disconnect between participants’ intuitions and the actual
results delivered by the criminal justice system is telling, not only as a
predictor of public disillusionment, but also as an indicator that legislative
aims are out of touch with public desires. Note, for example, that the coercive
crime-control cases in this study were not cases in which some renegade
prosecutor or rogue judge tricked the system but, rather, cases in which the
248
249
250
251

Rappaport, supra note 2, at 764–65.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 785.
See INTUITIONS supra note 1, at 110–40.
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crime-control doctrine was lawfully applied as designed. The fraud case
discussed above went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the conviction and
life sentence were affirmed.
The figure below visually displays the dramatic nature of the lawcommunity conflict revealed by the study. Note Case F, the fraud case, in the
right-hand margin. The solid line in the center indicates where on the
punishment continuum the subjects placed each case, close to the three-year
mark for Case F. The dashed sloping line indicates the punishment that was
actually imposed, life imprisonment.

The important point here is the dramatic difference between the solid
lines and the corresponding dashed lines for each case on the right side of
the figure. The enormity of the law-community conflict is emphasized by the
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fact that the punishment scale in this graphic is exponential, not linear. Each
of the larger dots, 1 through 8, represents about a doubling of punishment—
the standard structure of the U.S. criminal code’s offense grade categories.252
Thus, if the difference between the solid line and the dashed line for any case
was only the difference between 4 and 5 on the punishment scale, then the
offender in that case got a punishment twice as long as the subjects thought
was deserved. In fact, the community-law differences in each case were all
significantly greater than that.
How could such a conflict occur in a democracy? It is not the draconian
justice judgments of ordinary people that are producing these modern crimecontrol doctrines but, rather, politicians’ reliance on coercive crime-control
theories such as general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous—
crime-control theories developed and largely pressed in the past by
academics.253 Having criminal liability and punishment rules that track
community views could be an effective way of short-circuiting these
injustice-producing doctrines.
Still, some critics say that even the sentences imposed by the subjects in
the study described above are too high. As one critic noted, “Although the
sentences they chose were, on average, much more lenient than those
imposed in the actual cases on which they were based, they were still quite
substantial . . . . My own sense is that most of these sentences are ‘harsh.’”254
We may well agree with this critic’s personal sense, but that still does not
provide the basis for a conclusion that the proposed distributive principle
would necessarily condemn us to harsh penalties. While the principle of
blameworthiness proportionality may be permanently fixed in ordinary
people’s minds, we know from existing evidence that the general severity
level of the punishment continuum is not. Different societies have
significantly different endpoints on their punishment continuums, indicating
different accepted levels of harshness.255 And nothing in the proposed
distributive principle calls for higher, rather than lower, severity.
To maintain moral credibility, the criminal justice system cannot, at any
given time, fall too far below the general severity level deemed acceptable
by the community at that moment. However, one could nudge the endpoint
of the punishment continuum to reduce severity incrementally and on a
regular basis. Reducing it by 5% every year or two, for example, is unlikely
to be sufficient to undermine the system’s moral credibility, and people will
simply adjust their expectations accordingly.256 Indeed, this dynamic was
seen after the enactment of federal truth-in-sentencing legislation that did
away with early release on parole. Sentences imposed in court dropped
dramatically because they were now real sentences, not sentences subject to
parole commission release before one third of the sentence was served.

252
253
254
255
256

See 18 U.S.C. § 3559.
See DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 21–130.
Slobogin, supra note 2, at 402.
See Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 172–73.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining that the best sense of justice
is “one which matches [a person’s] judgments in reflective equilibrium”—a state reached after
consideration of various conceptions of justice).
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While there was some initial upset, it soon passed, and people adopted the
new sentences as establishing the new severity norm.257
Of course, we may all have our own personal preferences about how
severe punishment should be, but that does not make them the truth of the
proper severity level. Ultimately, the proper endpoint of the punishment
continuum is a political question for which any liberal democracy ought to
take into account community preferences. But personal preferences are
malleable, and as community views shift toward lower severity, the proposed
distributive principle would demand that criminal law shift as well.
Further, there is good reason to think that adopting a distributive
principle that maximizes moral credibility through empirical desert would
require an immediate reduction in the sentences imposed for most serious
offenses. At the moment, most serious offenses are given the same
punishment at the high end of the punishment continuum—death, life, thirty
years, or whatever the maximum might be. As we have shown, however,
people prefer strict blameworthiness proportionately, so the lay intuitions
captured by empirical desert would likely reflect this preference. Further, a
moral credibility distributive principle requiring strict blameworthiness
proportionality must reflect actual differences in blamewirthiness between
the most serious cases. In other words, sentences for most serious offenses
must be forced down from the high end of the punishment continuum in
order to distinguish the more egregious cases from the less egregious cases.
And, indeed, the punishment continuum high endpoint must be reserved for
the most egregious possible case, as some proposed and enacted criminal
codes adopting this principle state.258 (One implication of this might be that,
while the death penalty might remain on the books, it might never be used
because it would be inappropriate if one could imagine a more egregious
case than the case at hand, which one probably always can imagine.259)
Ultimately, a punishment system based on the distributive principle of
maximizing moral credibility through tracking empirical desert is likely to
be less punitive than its coercive crime-control alternatives of general
deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous.
B. THE PROPOSED DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE IS
UNPRINCIPLED AND MEANINGLESS
In addition to their concerns about empirical desert’s propensity for
harsh punishment, a number of critics dismiss the proposed distributive
principle as being unprincipled and meaningless. “One aspect of this claim
is particularly worrisome, and that is the implicit rejection of principle per
se. Populist sentencing, rebranded as ‘normative crime control’ is proposed
as the guiding factor at the expense of principled sentencing,” one critic
wrote.260 Another commented, “Once desert is untethered from the
257
258

See Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 229–32.
See e.g., Law No.6/2014 Penal Code § 92 (2014) (Maldives), https://www.law.upenn.edu/
live/files/4203-maldives-penal-code-2014; Draft Report of the Somali Criminal Law Recodification
Initiative, art. 1002(b), 47 (Mar. 2017), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6310-vol-1-and-2-somalirecodification.
259
See Law No. 6/2014 § 92.
260
Roberts & de Keijser, supra note 2, at 487–88.
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retributive principle of an eye for an eye, what does it mean to say that
someone deserves a particular punishment? Not much—or rather, almost
anything you like.”261
These criticisms seem to assume that we offer empirical desert as a
substitute for deontological desert and that it fails in that role. But we have
never made such a claim. Maximizing moral credibility by tracking
empirical desert, determined by social psychologists, is offered for its
consequentialist crime-control benefits. Deontological desert, as espoused
by moral philosophers, seeks to achieve objective justice through reasoning,
argument, and analysis. We have always been careful and explicit in
distinguishing the two.262
Perhaps some of these critics know that we have been careful to
distinguish deontological and empirical desert. Their real objection is just
that: that empirical desert is not deontological desert. That is, perhaps they
see value only in the principled, reasoned assessment of desert from moral
philosophers, which empirical desert is not. We would agree that there is
value in such philosophical work. It can provide a useful basis for
contributing to the public conversation, which can help shape community
justice judgments. But as Part VI(C) below demonstrates, deontological
desert, by its own terms, simply cannot produce a criminal code or
sentencing guidelines.
The distributive principle proposed here is indeed principled; it simply
has a consequentialist principle—that a system’s increased moral credibility
reduces crime—rather than a deontological one. And it is not meaningless; it
simply has a different meaning from deontological desert.
C. “COMMUNITY SENTENCING,” “CHERRY PICKING,” AND
THE PUBLIC AS BAD POLICYMAKERS
A number of criticisms have been offered that suggest, more than
anything, a misunderstanding of what is being proposed. These criticisms,
which encompass a wide assortment of flawed interpretations of empirical
desert, are addressed below.
261
New Desert, supra note 2, at 45; see also Methodology of Desert, supra note 2, at 1174
(“Robinson’s attempt to clear the way for empirical desert by discrediting its leading rival is based on a
misconception of the prevailing methodology in deontological ethics. Thus, Robinson imagines moral
philosophers engaging in flawed social science—merely surveying their own intuitions—to arrive at
‘transcendent’ judgments of desert and justice. The actual process is normative, not empirical, however,
and involves critical reflection on and systematic revision of one’s considered convictions in terms of the
values of the relevant political community. The resulting judgments are provisional, not transcendent,
aiming at a coherent account of our deepest commitments and their normative implications. Robinson’s
breezy rejection of the method of moral philosophy is thus based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
the enterprise.”).
262
See e.g., Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 152–53 (“The deontological conception of
desert is based upon reasoned analysis from principles of right and good, which produce a transcendent
notion of justice independent of the intuitions of justice of the community. The empirical conception of
desert has no such independent basis . . . . Perhaps even more important than such differences in
blameworthiness judgments are the differences between the underlying theories that drive the two
conceptions of desert and that thereby shape their application. In its most fundamental form, the difference
is this: The special value of the empirical conception of desert is its utilitarian effectiveness in crimecontrol; the special value of the deontological conception of desert is its ability to produce true principles
of justice independent of personal or community opinion.”).
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Some critics complain that the proposed distributive principle is one that
involves “community sentencing,” which would be dangerous and unwise.263
We agree that community sentencing would be dangerous and unwise.
Community sentencing of individual cases would be seriously unwise
because community views about a specific case could be distorted by media
misstatements of the facts, or subconscious and conscious biases arising
from the particular offender or offense.264
It is hard to know why these critics would think we would propose such
a thing. It has been made explicit from the start of this work that the proposal
is a distributive principle of criminal liability and punishment for developing
rules and policies; it does not outline a proposal for the adjudication of
individual cases. As one of us wrote more than a dozen years ago, the
proposal
envisions a set of liability and punishment rules to be applied
identically to all defendants; it is not the community’s view of
deserved punishment in a particular case that is relevant here. Further,
in collecting data to construct the rules, real cases, especially publicly
known cases, typically are not a useful source. People’s views on such
cases are commonly biased by political or social context or by other
factors, such as race, that all would agree have no proper role in setting
principles of justice.265
One of the strengths of empirical desert experiments, which test lay
intuitions, is that they can give a true sense of community justice judgments
free of these distortion effects. The scenarios used to test subjects do not
include factors that the community would generally agree are inappropriate
in making criminal liability and punishment decisions, such as the race of
the offender. On the whole, it appears that people are likely to see greater
moral credibility in cases that screened out these undesirable distortions.
But at least one critic apparently sees this aspect of empirical desert as a
weakness rather than a strength. In what is referred to as the “cherry-picking
challenge,” this critic argues that empirical desert theorists seek to capture
only particular aspects of punishment intuitions that best align with their
goals:
“Empirical desert advocates have yet to show why the particular
intuitions they examine are the ones most likely to help us improve
compliance. Rather, they often screen out certain intuitions in ways
that seem designed to promote more deontologically-justified
policies. In so doing, they seem to shift into a justificatory mode that
imports non-consequentialist values and undermines empirical
desert’s consequentialist foundations,” this critic explains.266 “To be
clear, I am not arguing that empirical desert advocates should query

263
See Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 43 (explaining one of the criticisms of empirical desert:
“While a community may share a view that certain conduct is immoral or certain punishment is just, such
views do not make it so. Witness the cases of slave holders in the pre-Civil War South.”).
264
See Denno, supra note 2, at 752–58.
265
Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 149.
266
Improve Empirical Desert, supra note 2, at 441.
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angry, biased, or drug addicted subjects. Rather, I claim that advocates
must defend their choices.”267
It is not difficult to defend against this challenge; from their own life
experience, ordinary people know the difference between an angry reaction
and a thoughtful response that attempts to be fair-handed and unbiased.
While they themselves might even be regularly guilty of the former, they will
respect and give deference to a criminal justice system that tries to do the
latter. Adopting this approach does not require an empirical desert advocate
to become a retributivist, as is suggested. It simply requires asking what
characteristics the general community would find to be admirable and what
characteristics it would find to be inappropriate in judging criminal liability
and punishment.268
Finally, some critics complain that ordinary people are simply too
uninformed about matters important to criminal justice policy to be consulted
in designing the system.269 A more specific challenge of the same sort asks
whether the public wants a distributive principle based upon empirical
desert.270 This type of criticism asks whether people would prefer a
distributive principle designed by experts rather than by their peers.
Once again, though, this criticism misunderstands empirical desert’s
function. As we said earlier, we do not propose relying on community views
about criminal justice policy approaches in order to determine what
distributive principle to use. Rather, we recommend consulting community
justice judgments to understand what increases the criminal justice system’s
moral credibility in the community. Thus, even though we can actually
discern what distributive principle the community would want—one based
upon their conception of desert, as the empirical studies have made clear271—
we are not proposing that a justice system follow the community’s view
because we think laypeople are the best policymakers but, rather, because
their views tell us how best to enhance the system’s reputation.

267
268

Id. at 448.
As Robinson has argued elsewhere, in designing their experiments, empirical desert researchers
would do well to consult the moral philosophy literature early in the design process, for there is no other
literature that has more carefully explored what the issues and alternatives might be. Paul H. Robinson,
The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48
WM & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1839 (2007) (“The moral philosophy literature is the richest and most
sophisticated source about lay intuitions of justice that exists today, and it is the starting point that I
recommend to any social psychologist doing research in the area.”).
269
Denno, supra note 2, at 754 (“Opinion polls in the United States and other countries show that
the public has little knowledge of the nature and extent of crime. Moreover, what little knowledge the
public has is substantially distorted . . . . Opinion polls also show that people have limited or poor
knowledge of their basic legal rights, or of particular pieces of legislation, even highly publicized legal
reforms. The general public evidences very little knowledge of sentencing structure or of the severity of
punishments that the legal system actually imposes . . . . [I]f the Justice respondents’ views are consistent
with the public’s, their overestimate of crime rates and re-offending, as well as their underestimate of the
criminal justice system’s sentencing severity, could influence their perceptions of certain legal
doctrines.”).
270
Ristroph, supra note 2, at 1168 (“If, as Robinson suggests, some democratically enacted laws such
as California’s three strikes law are inconsistent with empirical desert, one might ask whether there is a
majoritarian preference for laws aligned with moral intuitions.”).
271
See supra Section II.A.3.
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VI. IS THERE A BETTER DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE
THAN MAXIMIZING MORAL CREDIBILITY
THROUGH EMPIRICAL DESERT?
Whatever one may conclude about the strengths and weaknesses of the
proposed distributive principle—maximizing moral credibility through
empirical desert—the ultimate question in shaping criminal law and
sentencing rules is whether maximizing moral credibility is the best
distributive principle or whether, all things considered, there is a better one,
perhaps general deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, or deontological
desert. We will explain in Part VII that a moral credibility-based distributive
principle does have some weaknesses, though not those claimed by its critics,
but all alternative distributive principles have much greater weaknesses,
some of which may be altogether disqualifying. Thus, this Part examines
these competing distributive principles and demonstrates the seriousness of
their problems. We conclude that the greatest strength of maximizing moral
credibility as a distributive principle may be the weaknesses inherent in all
alternatives. Robinson has written a good deal on the subject,272 but let us
quickly sketch the nature of our criticisms of the various distributive
principles with whom moral credibility is said to compete.
A. GENERAL DETERRENCE
General deterrence can be an effective crime-control mechanism in
principle, but rarely in practice.273 Having a criminal justice system that
imposes punishment on wrongdoers certainly has a general deterrent effect.
Less clear, however, is the effectiveness of general deterrence as the
distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment—that is, setting
liability and punishment rules so as to maximize their general deterrent
effect.
To enhance general deterrence, the formulation of a criminal law must
meet at least three prerequisites. First, the intended audience must know of
the rule. Second, the intended audience must be rational calculators who can
and will behave in a way that promotes their self-interest in light of the rule.
And third, the intended audience’s cost-benefit analysis under the rule must
suggest that the cost of the contemplated violation outweighs its benefit.
Unfortunately, these prerequisites rarely exist in the real world. First, the
empirical research suggests that the target audience rarely knows the law.
Even when they think they know, they commonly have it wrong.274
Academics and politicians spend a good deal of time agonizing over the
formulation and adoption of coercive crime-control doctrines, such as the
felony murder rule, the three-strikes rule, the use of strict liability, and other
crime-control doctrines. But when a drug addict is standing outside the
convenience store deciding whether or not to go in and rob it, what are the
chances that he will know whether his jurisdiction has a felony-murder rule
and, if so, what variation it has? No doubt the jurisdiction’s lawmakers spent
272
273
274

codes.

See generally DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 21–98, 141–207.
Id. at 21–95.
This is a particular problem in the United States where there are fifty-one American criminal
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enormous energy debating just these issues, but it is more than likely that
those debates are all wasted on the would-be robber.
Second, even if people did know the legal rules, available research
suggests that the target audience is, more often than not, anything but rational
calculators. Instead, their decisions are heavily influenced by mental or
emotional disturbance; drug use or addiction; group influence, especially by
gangs; impulsiveness; and an indifference or inattentiveness to
consequences.
Finally, even if the target audience did know the legal rules and were
rational calculators, a general deterrent effect is possible only if the rational
calculations suggest that the costs of the wrongdoing outweigh the benefits.
Yet the capture and punishment rates for most offenses are so low—
commonly less than one hundred to one for offenses other than
homicide275—that members of the target audience commonly see the benefits
as outweighing the costs. More importantly, the result of the calculation
depends not on the reality of the situation but on the potential offender’s
perception of it. Thus, the empirical evidence276 indicating that many, if not
most, potential offenders generally overestimate their ability to avoid
detection and punishment suggests that the general deterrence project can
have limited effect even when capture and punishment rates were higher than
suspected.
General deterrence’s problems only grow worse when it is compared to
empirical desert. Criminal liability and punishment imposed under empirical
desert already have some inherent general deterrent effect. The only way in
which a general deterrence distributive principle can provide a greater
deterrent effect is by deviating from desert, yet a deviation from desert would
indicate that general deterrance is operating at its worst.
First, if general deterrence deviates from desert, then in every instance it
will trigger the crime-control costs that arise from its conflict with
community views. That is, such a deviation would make general deterrence
more effective but give rise to the crime-control costs that result from
reduced moral credibility on the other.
Second, it faces an enormous educational challenge if it is to have any
effect. To have an effect, people must know the deterrence-based rule. But
the empirical studies make clear that ordinary people assume the criminal
law rule is as they think it should be: formulated to give deserved punishment
based upon an offender’s overall blameworthiness, as discussed
previously.277 Thus, whenever general deterrence deviates from empirical
desert, it must overcome this desert rule assumption and make clear that the
rule is different than what people would otherwise expect. This can be
difficult and often impractical.
One might argue that it is unfair for us to offer this criticism because
empirical desert faces a similar challenge. Its compliance mechanism
275
276
277

See INTUITIONS supra note 1, at 100.
See DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 35.
See supra Sections II.A.3, II.A.5; Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 38 (explaining that several
studies have “examined the issue of what criteria people rely on when they make intuitive judgments of
justice and found that it is desert, not deterrence or incapacitation, that drive people’s intuitive
assignments of punishment.”).
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depends upon the community having an opinion about the system’s justness,
but as one critic explains, “A wide range of survey research indicates that the
public lacks knowledge about crime, crime rates, offender characteristics,
and legal reforms. In turn, these misconceptions could influence the
‘ordinary’ person’s perceptions of certain legal doctrines.”278
But we think the effective communication hurdle that is so problematic
for general deterrence does not apply to empirical desert. The message that
general deterrence must send is one that identifies a particular kind of
situation as one in which there is a threat of criminal liability and
punishment, a more severe punishment than an ordinary person would think
was deserved. That is a specific, nonintuitive fact which the general
deterrence system must get into the minds of its target audience. It must also
get them to use this fact when performing the cost-benefit analysis that
guides their conduct. In contrast, all that is required for empirical desert is
for people to have some general opinion about the moral credibility of the
criminal justice system, an opinion that every ordinary person will
necessarily have from their exposure to an endless stream of information that
they absorb from news media, governmental statements, friends, and others.
Having an opinion on the justness of the criminal law does not require
awareness of a particular fact, like general deterrence requires.
It is certainly true that the criminal justice system ought to make an effort
to improve its reputation because that improvement can bring greater
compliance, but even if the system has no public relations campaign to
improve its image, the moral credibility-compliance dynamic will still be at
work. It will still be the case that regular conflicts with community views
will reduce its credibility, and a reduction in conflicts will increase it.
B. INCAPACITATION OF THE DANGEROUS
Incapacitation of the dangerous is as problematic a distributive principle
as general deterrence, but for different reasons.279 Unlike general deterrence,
which has real difficulty producing a greater deterrent effect than that already
inherent in a system designed to maximize moral credibility, incapacitation
does, in fact, work. Putting people in prison prevents further victimization,
at least of the community. The problem with an incapacitation distributive
principle is that behavioral scientists are, at present, relatively poor
predictors of recidivism for specific individuals. False positive rates are high,
which creates enormous costs and intrusions on personal liberty with no
crime-control benefit. The incapacitation distributive principle is particularly
disadvantaged in the United States, where constitutional limitations enforced
by courts limit the open use of preventive detention and require instead that
it be cloaked in criminal justice terms. Further, there is enormous political,
and sometimes legal, resistance to preventive detention, so instead of using
predicted future dangerousness, liability and sentencing rules commonly use
substitutes like prior criminal record to set sentences, which have turned out
to be even worse approximations of recidivism.
278
279

Denno, supra note 2, at 765.
DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 99–108 (examining rehabilitation as a distributive
principle).
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Finally, as with general deterrence, even if there were a situation in
which preventive detention could provide a crime-control benefit by
deviating from desert, any such advantage could be wiped out by the loss of
crime-control effectiveness that comes when such interventions deviate from
desert. Incapacitation as a distributive principle can only provide more
prevention than that already inherent in a distributive principle of
maximizing moral credibility by deviating from empirical desert. But
preventive detention, in this respect, is in an even worse position than general
deterrence. At least general deterrence follows a proportionality principle of
sorts that is consistent with empirical desert: the more the wrongdoing should
be deterred, the more it is worth investing in a greater deterrent threat
(proportionality to harm rather than proportionality to blameworthiness). But
incapacitation has no such principle of punishment proportionality to the
seriousness of the past wrongdoing; rather, the duration of the detention is
tied to the risk of future dangerousness rather than the seriousness of the
offense. It is for this reason, under an incapacitation theory, that the Supreme
Court has historically allowed three-strikes-means-life rules for even minor
crimes, such as fraud in the Rummel case discussed in Part V(A).280
Thus, punishment (acknowledging that the term fits awkwardly here
because the detention has nothing to do with the past offense and everything
to do with prediction of a future offense) unbound from any sense of
proportionality to the wrongdoing would likely be seen as appallingly unjust
by most citizens. Thus, incapacitation of the dangerous would be even more
likely than general deterrence to destroy the criminal justice system’s
reputation for being just and thereby undermine its social influence to gain
compliance, deference, and internalization.
C. DEONTOLOGICAL DESERT
We are sympathetic to those advocating deontological desert as the
criminal justice system’s distributive principle. Unfortunately, we must all
face the reality that it is simply impossible to operationalize such a principle.
Moral philosophers disagree among themselves about most issues relevant
to criminal liability and punishment. If the criminal justice system endorsed
deontological desert as its distributive principle, how would a criminal code
or a sentencing guideline drafter know which philosopher or group of
philosophers to follow on any given issue? Having non-philosophers make
such judgments about the relative credibility of one philosopher over another
short-circuits the reasoned rationality that marks out deontological desert as
particularly desirable.
If one were trying to create a distributive principle that had high moral
credibility among moral philosophers, voting among them might make
sense, but that would not be deontological desert as a distributive principle
but, rather, some special philosophers’ variation on empirical desert. Given
that philosophers as a group are not commonly a major source of crime, their
principle would seem to lack any utilitarian crime-control justification.
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Perhaps the larger point is that deontological desert’s appeal is that it
represents the transcendent truths about justice. When two moral
philosophers disagree on an issue, we know that one of them, if not both,
must be wrong. The only way to preserve the transcendent-truth advantage
of deontological desert from this dilemma is to have some rational, reasoned
mechanism by which we can figure out which philosopher is right, and there
is no way by which humans can do that. The bottom line is that deontological
desert is a beautiful aspirational goal but, as a practical matter, simply cannot
be operationalized.
To evaluate the infeasibility of operationalizing deontological desert,
consider, for example, the issue of assigning punishment for criminal
attempts. Should an unsuccessful attempt be punished the same as the
substantive offense or be treated as less severe because the contemplated
offense harm or evil did not come about? The empirical studies make clear
that nearly all ordinary people would grade the completed offense as more
serious than the failed attempt because the harm or evil of the offense
actually manifests, which, in the minds of ordinary people, increases the
offender’s blameworthiness and deserved punishment.281 But the
deontologists are very much split on the issue.282 Some agree with the
community view, but many disagree, correctly pointing out that the conduct
and intention of an assassin who attempts murder and one who actually
commits it are exactly the same and that it is only a matter of moral luck as
to which victim is missed and which is killed. How is the criminal code or
sentencing commission drafter to decide which of these conflicting camps to
follow when they decide how to grade criminal attempts? What is the
mechanism that they are to use in evaluating which of these camps is
“correct”?
Even if one wanted drafters to follow deontological desert, any
mechanism they could use for picking one philosophical camp over another
would illustrate the impossibility of operationalizing deontological desert as
a distributive principle. If they take a vote among the moral philosophers to
see which position is the majority view, or if they look to see which group is
made up of scholars with better reputations within the moral philosophy
community, they are no longer operating under the reasoned analysis that
gives deontological desert its draw. If they instead simply look to their own
personal judgments of which position best reflects just deserts, then again
they would fail to abide by the reasoned analysis deontological desert
requires. If they try to play the role of moral philosopher by reviewing the
arguments on both sides and trying to reason which position is the correct
position themselves, then they might be able to claim that their method is
reasoned analysis, but it would be hard to say that the stumblings of these
amateur philosophers are what we can trust to produce the correct
deontological desert answer.
The truth is that deontological desert simply cannot provide the “correct”
deontological desert answer. It is not, in fact, an operationalizable
distributive principle but, rather, an expression of the value of reasoned
analysis and of thinking critically about criminal liability and punishment
281
282

Id.
DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 146–47.
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rules. But while academics may cherish reasoned debate and can provide
useful insights by doing so, it is quite different from providing a distributive
principle for criminal liability and punishment upon which the real world can
draft criminal codes, sentencing guidelines, and policy statements.283
It is also the case that deontological desert would not have the crimecontrol effectiveness that empirical desert does. Deontological desert will, at
times, conflict with community views and thereby undermine criminal law’s
moral credibility.
Empirical desert probably offers the best practical approximation of
deontological desert rules. In discussing the issue of grading criminal
attempts above, we saw that the deontologists are split on the issue, while
ordinary people tend to agree that attempts should be punished less severely
than the corresponding substantive offense. Attempt grading is a useful
example to show that there really is a difference between deontological and
empirical desert. However, it is also true that, on most issues, the majority of
moral philosophers are likely to support the community’s empirical desert
position. That should be no surprise, really, given that deontologists are
human beings who probably share the community’s intuitions of justice,
even if their reasoned theoretical work may, in some instances, lead them to
different conclusions.
In our experience, most moral philosophers who review the results of the
empirical studies on topics such as those listed previously284 will likely feel
comfortable with most if not all of those results.
D. CONCLUSION
To summarize, general deterrence as a distributive principle is functional
in theory but ineffective in practice, especially because it can have a greater
general deterrent effect than that already inherent in our proposed
distributive principle only when it deviates from desert, which is when it is
least effective.285 Incapacitation of the dangerous as a distributive principle
does work, in the sense that it can prevent crime by those detained, but
researchers, at their current clinical capacity, are unable to reliably predict
283
Another way of expressing this same point is to explain that asking a decision-maker to use
deontological desert as a distributive principle, in fact, gives one a distributive principle significantly
different from true deontological desert. It is rather a deceptive cloak that carries the deontological desert
label but actually represents the undisclosed personal beliefs and preferences of the decision-maker. When
the criminal code commission members are deciding what culpability requirement to use for complicity,
having been instructed to use deontological desert as a distributive principle, what will they do? In a wellresourced and fastidious commission, they will look at the moral philosophy literature on the point, but
after finding that there is significant disagreement, they will have to choose one theory over another. But
that choice, of course, will be a function of many factors, such as their personal views, that may have
nothing to do with the strength of the competing philosophical arguments. Even if they are trained moral
philosophers—we know of no such criminal code reform commission—and take the arguments seriously,
why does their particular view of the debate, which conflicts with the views of other moral philosophers,
suddenly qualify as the “truth”? The larger point is that setting deontological desert as the governing
distributive principle does nothing to assure a consistent, predictable, transcendent truth, but only an
invitation to decision-makers to use in their own intuitions of justice. In contrast, empirical desert as a
distributive principle can give a specific, clear, predictable, fixed answer based upon the collective
intuitive judgments of the community rather than those of a particular decision-maker.
284
See generally INTUITIONS, supra note 1, at 239–75 (testing lay intuitions on attempt liability,
criminal risk, complicity, and omission liability).
285
See supra Section VI.A.
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future dangerousness, and, if implemented, this principle would essentially
destroy the criminal justice system’s reputation for being a reliable moral
authority that does justice and avoids injustice.286 Deontological desert is
highly attractive as a distributive principle, but, by its own terms of relying
strictly upon rational analysis, it cannot produce a working criminal code or
sentencing guidelines because there is no means by which the inevitable
disagreements can be resolved by more rational analysis. In order to come
up with the single answer required by drafters for each of the hundreds or
thousands of issues that must be resolved, drafters would have to resort to
non-deontological analysis, such as voting to decide competing claims,
which would yield a result that is not deontological desert.287 Support for this
distributive principle should be seen as public acclaim for the value in
rational discourse about the deeper meaning of justice—a project that we
very much support but not a project that qualifies as a distributive principle
for criminal liability and punishment in drafting real-world rules.
Among the critics, some seem to have never offered an alternative
distributive principle,288 which may have made it more difficult for them to
see the virtues of empirical desert. Several critics seem to enthusiastically
support deontological desert as a distributive principle,289 and at least one
has publicly supported dangerousness as a distributive principle,290 but, as
noted here, those principles simply do not provide realistic alternatives to
one that maximizes moral credibility.
VII. POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES OF THE PROPOSED
DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE NOT RAISED BY CRITICS
While the critics have raised quite a few issues, which we have
addressed, there are some potential weaknesses in the proposed distributive
principle of maximizing the criminal law’s moral credibility with the
community, typically by tracking empirical desert. Perhaps the critics would
have eventually gotten around to offering these criticisms, but two issues are
worth addressing now: first, the proposed distributive principle limits the
extent to which criminal law can be used to change existing norms. Second,
the proposed principle requires one to be ever-vigilant in testing existing
norms for whether they might deserve special reform attention.
A. LIMITING THE USE OF CRIMINAL LAW AS A MEANS OF
CHANGING COMMUNITY NORMS
One reason to worry about having criminal law generally rely upon
community justice judgments is that such a system may tend to impede the
use of criminal law to bring about social change. Relying upon community
views presumably means relying upon people’s existing views. But we know

286
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288

See supra Section VI.B.
See supra Section VI.C.
See, e.g., Denno, supra note 2; Roberts & de Keijser, supra note 2; Rappaport, supra note 2;
Ristroph, supra note 2.
289
See, e.g., Simons, supra note 2; Methodology of Desert, supra note 2.
290
See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2003).
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from history that existing views are not always the best for society. Changing
those views can sometimes bring about a better world.
Does reliance upon a moral credibility distributive principle condemn
society to live with existing views forever? No. As criminal law improves its
moral credibility with the community—as it “earns moral credibility chips”
with the community—it can selectively spend those chips by having criminal
law lead rather than follow on selected issues of special importance to social
reformers. The greater the moral credibility of the criminal law, the greater
the criminal law’s power to help shift community views. In other words, a
criminal law system that has earned a reputation as a reliable moral authority
can be a powerful influence in the hands of social reformers. Consider, for
example, the recent decriminalization of same-sex marriage and increased
criminalization of domestic violence and date rape. These criminal law
reforms no doubt helped solidify the ongoing shift in community views.
However, the problem is that if criminal law deviates too substantially
from community views, the disparity between the two can potentially
undermine the law’s moral credibility. American Prohibition, discussed
previously, proves this point. Where the law reform did not successfully
change community views, it provided a constant source of conflict points
that increasingly undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility. As noted
previously,291 crime rates during Prohibition went up, and not just for
alcohol-related offenses but also for a wide range of offenses unrelated to
alcohol. People became habituated to lawbreaking. Perhaps worse, pushing
too far ahead without successfully shifting views can undermine the law’s
reputation such that the law becomes less useful to social reformers in the
future.
The lesson for social reformers here is simply to be careful in “spending
the criminal law’s credibility chips.” Criminal law should not be used as a
reform device until other societal institutions—political, social, religious,
and others—have gained community support. With that momentum, criminal
law can make a real contribution to social change. And, as community views
continue to change, the damaging conflict points will increasingly diminish.
B. THE NEED TO KEEP TESTING EXISTING NORMS
AGAINST SOCIETAL ASPIRATIONS
Because empirical desert is not deontological desert, any society must
be vigilant about testing what its members will want existing norms to look
like in the future. Neither laypeople nor moral philosophers have
clairvoyance to see around history’s corner, but we can remain aware that
some of our current norms will indeed be seen as inappropriate by future
generations. Further, we should constantly critically assess our existing
norms to see whether we think they ought to change.
Moral philosophers, and many social and political organizations and
institutions, are available to help us in that constant testing. But they are not
likely to have clear answers for us, for if the answer were clear, it probably
would have already altered or be in the process of altering existing norms.
291
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Nonetheless, these sources of critical debate can at least identify for us the
possibilities. Will society come to accept the notion that sentient animals
should have the same rights as humans? Will ordinary expectations of
privacy dramatically expand? Will suicide be seen as a human right? It is
impossible to tell at the moment what our future society will decide, but it is
worth asking the question.
This is not a problem unique to moral credibility as a distributive
principle, of course. Any distributive principle, including deontological
desert, will have the same problem. But by openly acknowledging the
problem, we can emphasize the importance of this type of societal
questioning. There is no reason to think that deontological desert supporters
will cease to raise the challenges and questions that they have in the past,
which is helpful in our constant testing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have sought to show that the criminal justice system’s reputation
with the community can have a significant effect on the extent to which
people are willing to comply with its demands and internalize its norms. That
reputation can be affected by a variety of things, including the fairness of the
system’s adjudication procedures, the professionalism of its police, and the
perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice authorities themselves. Our
focus has been on the effect of the system’s long-term reputation for doing
justice and avoiding injustice, its “moral credibility” with the community.
Common sense aside, real-world natural experiments and controlled
empirical studies support the notion that reduced moral credibility
incrementally reduces compliance and internalization of the law’s norms.
The evidence also suggests that regular conflicts with community views
undermine the law’s moral credibility. Thus, we have proposed that the
distributive principle used to draft criminal codes, sentencing guidelines, and
sentencing policy statements should maximize the criminal law’s moral
credibility, which can be achieved by adopting rules and policies that avoid
persistent conflicts with community conceptions of justice.
We have presented and responded to a wide variety of objections from
critics of this proposal. We have shown that those criticisms are commonly
and simply inconsistent with the available evidence, anecdotal and scientific,
or reflect an inaccurate understanding of our proposal. Conversely, we have
suggested two limitations of our proposal, even though critics have not yet
done so: the need for care in using criminal law to help change norms and
the need to remain ever-vigilant in testing current community views on the
justness of our system’s norms.
Perhaps most importantly, we have evaluated the alternative distributive
principles and found that they have serious, often disqualifying, problems.
We conclude that the greatest strength of maximizing moral credibility as a
distributive principle may be the weakness of the alternatives. General
deterrence works in principle, but because the prerequisites for its effective
operation rarely exist in the real world, it is impractical as a distributive
principle. Incapacitation of the dangerous does indeed protect the community
from dangerous offenders by incapacitating them, but because we lack the
ability to predict future criminality with any significant degree of reliability,
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such a distributive principle would unjustifiably restrain non-dangerous
offenders. Worse, because maximizing moral credibility carries with it an
inherent general deterrent and incapacitation effect, these distributive
principles can provide greater crime-control effectiveness only by deviating
from empirical desert, thereby producinging an endless stream of cases in
which the community might perceive a significant injustice or failure of
justice. This would undermine the law’s moral credibility and reduce both
compliance with the laws and its internalization power.
Deontological desert is an attractive alternative, but we have shown that
it simply cannot be operationalized. Its search for the transcendent truth
through rational analysis is an important and necessary activity and one that
we assume moral philosophers will continue to pursue even if criminal
justice systems adopt a distributive principle that maximizes moral
credibility. Deontologists can encourage the constant testing of existing
community views, which we endorse. Constant questioning will hopefully
lead to public conversations by which community views over time change
for the better. But while the never-ending debate and analytic processes of
deontological desert work well in the role of thoughtful gadfly, they cannot
generate a codified body of criminal law or sentencing guidelines and
policies. Deontological desert supporters should take some comfort in the
fact that an empirical desert-based distributive principle will produce results
that most closely align with majority views among deontologists. That is,
while empirical desert is not deontological desert, it may be the best practical
approximation of the most popular positions among deontologists.
Whether one believes that criminal law’s goal ought to be to minimize
future crime or to do justice and avoid injustice, one ought to support a
distributive principle for making criminal law rules and policies that
maximizes their moral credibility with the community.

